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ABSTRACT: In practice, the problem of law enforcement is half a matter of
what the government does to catch violators and half a matter of what violators do
to avoid getting caught. In the theory of law enforcement, however, although the
state’s efforts at “detection” play a decisive role, offenders’ efforts at “detection
avoidance” are largely ignored. Always problematic, this imbalance has become
critical in recent years as episodes of corporate misconduct spur new interest in
punishing process crimes like obstruction of justice and perjury. This article adds
detection avoidance to the existing theoretical frame with an eye toward informing
the current policy debate. The exercise leads to several conclusions. First, despite
recent efforts to strengthen laws governing obstruction and perjury, sanctioning is
relatively inefficacious at discouraging detection avoidance. Sanctions send a
mixed message to the offender: do less to avoid detection, but to the extent you still
do something, do more to avoid detection of your detection avoidance. The article
argues that detection avoidance is more effectively deterred through the structural
design of evidentiary procedure (inclusive of investigation). Specifically advocated
are devices that exploit the cognitive shortcomings of potential avoiders and the
strategic instability of their cooperative arrangements, thereby lowering the cost
effectiveness of devoting resources to avoiding detection.
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I. Introduction

People who violate the law go out of their way to avoid getting
caught. This is one of the defining features of law enforcement. It
must have been present in the primordial pools of social
organization. And in the complexity of modern criminal and
regulatory administration, it remains among the most basic of organic
formulae.
Unfortunately, it has never been a defining feature of our understanding
of law enforcement.1 Our theories of crime and regulation view
evidence too much as something that investigators uncover, and not
enough as something that violators cover up. Our theories of
evidence and procedure focus too much on wrongdoing as the
subject of evidence, and not enough on evidence as the object of
wrongdoing. A curricular crevasse marks the spot that ought to be
occupied by an integrated approach accounting for both
“detection”—a term of art encompassing investigation, prosecution,
and liability—and “detection avoidance.”
The divergence between theory and reality in this area has become all
the more apparent and urgent in recent years as events such as those
at Enron,2 WorldCom,3 and HealthSouth4 reverberate through
Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts.5 Episodes of
evidentiary foul play often form crucial subplots in these dramas of
corporate malfeasance.6 Process crimes have accordingly been swept
up in the “get tough” policy posture that such events have fostered.

Part II discusses the relevant literature in detail.
See, e.g., Superseding Indictment, United States v. Causey, (S.D. Tex. 2004) (H-04-25 (S-2))
(describing alleged financial fraud at Enron); Carrie Johnson, Skilling, Lay Cases Build on Plea
Deals, WASH. POST, Sep. 17, 2004, at E01 (listing guilty pleas in related prosecutions).
3 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ebbers, (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (S3 02 Cr. 1144)
(detailing financial fraud at WorldCom); Ken Belson, Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in
$11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2005, at A1 (reporting conviction).
4 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Scrushy, (N.D. Ala. 2004) (CR-03-BE-0530-S)
(describing alleged fraud at HealthSouth). Scrushy was acquitted. Simon Romero & Kyle
Whitmire, Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquitted in $2.7 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2005, at A1. But seventeen of his subordinates pled guilty. Milt Fruedenheim, New
Indictment for Ex-Chief of HealthSouth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at C5. Moreover, as of this
writing, the SEC plans to continue prosecuting its civil suit against Scrushy, which was
stayed during the criminal trial. Commission’s Response to Order to Show Cause, SEC v.
HealthSouth, (N.D. Ala. 2005) (03-J-0615-S).
5 See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005) (reviewing recent corporate
scandals in historical context).
6 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2131-2135 (2005)
(describing conviction of Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) for
“corruptly persuading” others to alter and destroy audit-related documents; reversing and
remanding for overbroad jury instructions); Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Scrushy (Indicting HealthSouth CEO, Richard Scrushy under 18 U.S.C. §1621 for lying to
SEC investigators and under 18 U.S.C. §1512(b) for attempting to persuade a subordinate to
give false testimony). But see U.S. v. Scrushy, (N. D. Ala, April 15, 2005) (CR-03-BE-0530-S)
(mem. and order) (dismissing §1621 charges); Kyle Whitmire, As Deliberations Near in Fraud
1
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Congress’s chief response to corporate misconduct, the SarbanesOxley Act,7 passed in July 2002, includes several provisions
broadening the definition of obstruction of justice.8 The Act also
directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to conduct an emergency9
review of the penalties for obstruction to insure that they are
“sufficient to deter and punish.”10 The Commission responded in
January 2003 by effectively doubling the (now advisory11) sentence
for substantially obstructive acts.12
Correspondingly, “strengthening laws to crack down on obstruction
of justice” makes the short list of Bush administration proposals to
restore “corporate responsibility.”13 The administration’s Corporate
Fraud Task Force14—a “financial crimes SWAT team”15 comprised of
the nation’s top regulatory and enforcement personnel16—has
explicitly taken aim at evidentiary misbehavior. The category
“obstruction of justice, perjury, witness tampering or other
obstructive behavior” rounds out “falsification of … financial
information” and “self-dealing” in the Task Force’s tripartite
definition of its eponym, “corporate fraud.”17 Task Force members

Case, Scrushy Lawyers Win Dismissal of Two Counts, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, at C5 (describing
dismissal of §1512(b) charges).
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
8 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 802 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 1520) and 1102 (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)).
9 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 805(b), 1104(a),(c).
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 805(a), 1104(a)(4).
11 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-757 (2005) (holding Federal Sentencing
Guidelines “effectively advisory” rather than mandatory).
12 The Commission increased the base level for obstruction of justice and obstruction related
offenses (including perjury) from 12 to 14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§
2J1.2(a), 2J1.3(a) (2004). It also added a new two level enhancement for offenses “extensive
in scope, planning, or preparation.” Id. §2J1.2(a). See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF
2002 2003, available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/S-Oreport.pdf, at ii-iii (describing
combined effect of sentencing changes).
13 CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1.4 (July 22,
2003) [hereinafter CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first year report.pdf.
14 Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 FED. REG. 46,091 (July 9, 2002) (establishing Corporate Fraud
Task Force); CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT, supra note 13 at 1.2
(“Since its creation the Task Force has coordinated and overseen all corporate fraud matters
under investigation by the Department of Justice and enhanced inter-agency coordination of
regulatory and criminal investigations.”)
15 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Corporate Responsibility at the
Regent Wall Street Hotel, New York, New York (July 9, 2002), reprinted in 38 WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1158-61 (July 15, 2002).
16 Members include the Chairman of the SEC, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of the
Treasury, high level officials in the Department of Justice, and United States Attorneys from
key urban areas. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT, supra note 13, at
back of title page; see also CORPORATE TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT
back
of
title
page
(July
20,
2004),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd yr fraud report.pdf.
17 CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.2 n.1.
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publicly profess to “have understood Congress’s clear mandate that
they aggressively pursue obstructive conduct.”18
That understanding appears to have been actualized in several high
profile convictions. In June 2002, for instance, the accounting firm
Arthur Anderson was convicted of obstruction of justice for
destroying audit-related documents on the eve of an SEC
investigation into its treatment of Enron’s special purpose entities
(though the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
overbroad jury instructions in May 2005).19 Martha Stewart and her
broker were convicted in March 2004 of obstruction, perjury, and
lying to investigators in relation to Stewart’s fortuitous sale of
ImClone stock on the eve of an unfavorable FDA announcement.20
And in May 2004 investment banker, Frank Quattrone was convicted
of obstruction for urging subordinates to “clean up those files” after
learning that his firm was under grand jury investigation for its
method of allocating shares in initial public offerings.21 Regulators
and prosecutors point to these and other cases as evidence that their
toughened attitude is more than just talk.22

18 CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.8. See also
Harvey L. Pitt, Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks before the U.S. Department of Justice
Corporate
Fraud
Conference
(Sept.
26,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm. (“Prosecutions for lying to the SEC,
destroying documents under SEC subpoena, or otherwise seeking to illegally frustrate our
investigations also yield huge programmatic benefits. They have a significant deterrent
effect.”); Statement of Deputy Attorney General, Larry Thompson, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pjus/is_200206/ai_1676538092 (“We will
continue to vigorously pursue the obstruction of justice—a crime that undermines our
justice system—where individuals or business organizations illegally interfere with the
responsibilities of government investigators.”).
19 Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2131-2135 (2005) (detailing
Andersen’s evidence destruction, its conviction under 18 USC § 1512(b) for knowingly
corruptly persuading others to alter and destroy documents, and its loss on appeal; reversing
and remanding).
20 United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing Martha
Stewart’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to investigators and § 1505 for
obstructing an agency proceeding, her broker’s conviction under these two statutes and also
under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury) for lying under oath to an SEC investigator, and the
conviction of both Stewart and her broker for conspiring to do the same).
21 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Banker Is Found Guilty of Obstruction: Retrial Victory for U.S.;
Star of Technology Boom in ‘90’s Suggested Staff “Clean Up Files,” N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1.
But see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Andersen Ruling Could Aid Appeal of Former Banker, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2004, at C6 (discussing Quattrone’s prospects for appeal in light of the Supreme
Court’s Andersen ruling.)
22 CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE FIRST YEAR REPORT, supra note 13 at 2.8 (citing example
of Quattrone conviction); Pitt, supra note 18; Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Remarks To The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,
Mid-South Chapter, Memphis, Tennessee (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/speeches/2004_2954_rmks2CFC_TN090204.
pdf. (“[L]ying to government investigators, obstructing our investigations, should be
understood as one of the surest paths to severe consequences. That message should be
coming through loud and clear with the convictions of Martha Stewart and First Boston’s
Frank Quattrone in New York, and, of course, the conviction of the Arthur Andersen firm
in the Enron investigation.”).
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Such apparent shifts in the law’s posture toward process crimes—and
detection avoidance generally—have far outpaced our understanding
of how the law ought to address such activities. This is more than
just a catch-up problem for basic research. Conscientious practical
policy discussions in this area inevitably lead to a series of
foundational questions—questions for which scholarship would be
the natural reference, but which it is largely unprepared to answer.
Which forms of detection avoidance should be criminalized? How
severe should sentences be? How vigorously should potential
detection avoidance activity be investigated and prosecuted? Which
forms of detection avoidance should be punished merely with
procedural devices, like adverse jury instructions or burden shifting,
rather than criminal penalties? Should the imposition of detection
avoidance sanctions—whether criminal or procedural—require
evidence of an underlying offense? How should investigators adjust
the conduct of their investigation of the underlying offense upon
encountering evidence of obstructive behavior? How, in general,
should the law respond to the elemental problem of detection
avoidance?
This article has two objectives. The first is to help lay a foundation
upon which questions such as these can be answered. The second is
to begin to provide some answers. As a starting point, the article
trains its sights on but one of law’s purposes, albeit one generally
regarded to be among the most important: deterring violations
through threat of penalty.23 The article explores how this enterprise
is affected by, and ought to be adjusted to account for, the effort that
individuals exert to neutralize that threat.

23 See Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment in
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds.), forthcoming
July 2005 (reviewing the empirical evidence and finding that “deterrence has a substantial but
far from complete role in explaining observed patterns of criminal activity.”); Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 377, 422-23 (1994) (finding sustainable the view that current tort law does significantly
deter in light of institutional detail and empirical studies, but discounting the possibility of
fine tuning). But see Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173, 197-204 (2004) (reviewing empirical
evidence, finding no general material ex ante effect from “the formulation of criminal law
rules or even sentencing polices or practices,” but allowing such effects from “having a
criminal justice system that administers punishment” and “changes in police practices or
allocation of resources”). Deterrence is tempered by other important values, issues, and
instruments—including retributive justice, social norms, social meaning, professional
responsibility, political economy, and constraints on state power. See infra note 49. In the
specific context of detection avoidance, such additional considerations are discussed in, e.g.,
Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 28 (2005) (seeking to
explain common moral perceptions regarding evidentiary foul play) and Daniel C. Richman
& William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: an Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005) (criticizing “pretextual prosecution”—including for perjury
and obstruction—for its tendency to muddy the information content of convictions and
thereby limit the public’s ability to monitor prosecutors.)
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The analysis in the article is centered around a fundamental, though
largely unexplored24 formula of law enforcement—call it the
“detection avoidance principle.” Sanctioning a given species of
violation not only discourages that violation, it also encourages those
who still commit the violation to expend additional resources
avoiding detection. The greater the penalty, that is, the more
imperative the cover up.25 Raising the sentence on securities fraud,
for instance, has the dual effect of deterring the fraud and spurring its
concealment.
From a societal perspective detection avoidance is deadweight loss.26
Resources expended structuring, following, and monitoring a
document “retention” policy, for example, are resources diverted
from innovation, production, and distribution. The best empirical
evidence, reviewed in Part III, suggests that the social cost of
detection avoidance is substantial—certainly relative to the social cost
of detection, which plays such a decisive role in current enforcement
theory. The extent to which an enforcement regime inspires
additional private expenditure on detection avoidance is in fact as
important a determinant of its cost effectiveness as the extent to
which it requires additional public expenditure on detection.
What then can be done to lessen this wasteful byproduct of
sanctioning underlying violations? One possibility is to sanction
detection avoidance as well. Such is apparently the first impulse of
many law makers27 and legal scholars.28 And the logic is admittedly
Part II describes in detail the vanishingly small role that this principle has so far played in
the development of enforcement theory. Preliminary explorations of this principle include
(in chronological order) Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening, and Optimum Enforcement, 21
RAND J. ECON. 341 (1990) (qualifying a result due to Professor Becker, described infra in
Part II.A, that deterrence is most efficiently generated with large fines and small detection
probabilities); Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law
Enforcement, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 239 (2001) (analyzing detection avoidance in the context
of discounted sanctions for self-reporting); Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, Should
Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of
Decoupling, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (2004) (exploring the implications of defendants’ litigation
effort for optimal “decoupling” of defendants’ liability and plaintiffs’ recovery).
25 The article focuses on the detection avoidance activities of those who are guilty of
underlying violations. Sanctions may also induce the innocent to exert additional evidentiary
effort avoiding wrongful prosecution and liability. Many of the same principles apply to
such exertions, though on a smaller scale. Those who refrain from wrongdoing have in
effect chosen that forbearance as their chief means of avoiding detection, whereas those who
commit the wrongdoing have only the evidentiary variety of detection avoidance to shield
them from punishment.
26 Part IV (supplemented by the mathematical appendix) more fully describes the impact of
detection avoidance on the social welfare calculus.
27 See supra text surrounding notes 2-22.
28 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Winand Emmons, Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing
Mechanisms for Courts, 17 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 307 (2004) (proposing that witnesses post bonds
forfeited on later discovery of false testimony): Robert Cooter & Winand Emmons, TruthRevealing Mechanisms for Courts, 159 J. INST’L & THEOR’L ECON. 259 (2003) (similar); JAMIE S.
GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.1, at
66 (1989) (“discovery sanctions provide the most comprehensive and flexible remedies for
24
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compelling. Sanctioning robbery discourages robbery. Why should
perjury be any different?
But what this logic fails to take into account is that the detection
avoidance principle applies as well to detection avoidance—that the
principle is, in fact, fully recursive.29
Just as hiking up sanctions on securities fraud encourages violators to
exert more effort avoiding detection of their securities fraud, so
hiking up sanctions on detection avoidance encourages detection
avoiders to exert more effort avoiding detection of their detection
avoidance. Sanctioning cover up, that is, makes covering up the
cover up more imperative.
Can’t we then also sanction cover up of cover up? Perhaps we can.
But if it is fair to assume that cover up once removed is something
that the government can discern, sanction, and thereby discourage,
then it is also fair to assume that violators can discern cover up once
removed as an activity that can itself be covered up. And it is
therefore fair to conclude that the added sanction will inspire cover
up twice removed just as it inhibits cover up once removed.
There is, of course, no logical end to this rhetorical see-you-and raiseyou. Every additional assertion that the next order of cover up,
newly encouraged by the last order of sanctioning, can itself be
sanctioned is defeated by the retort that, in that case, the next order
of cover up will itself be more strenuously covered up in response.
evidence destruction in civil litigation”); Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE
L. REV. 1755 (1996) (advocating a tougher stance toward perjury); Richard D. Friedman,
Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (1997) (describing when “public
remedies” might be preferable to procedural and evidentiary sanctions or independent tort
claims); Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621
(1998) (advocating judge-centered responses to unreasonable evidentiary incompleteness);
Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial
Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991) (arguing for more vigorous enforcement of existing
laws and rules against spoliation); Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant’s Remedies for an
Opponent’s Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1983)
(advocating tightening laws against evidentiary foul play); Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability
for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1997)
(advocating recognition of a spoliation tort); Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53
DUKE L. J. 1215, 1326 (2004) [hereinafter, Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering] (analyzing the
primary activity deterrence effect of sanctions on “evidence tampering” broadly defined).
29 Roughly speaking, a recursive formula is one whose output can be plugged back in as an
input. Human reproduction is an example: humans in, humans out. For a helpful discussion
of recursion and its role in linguistics, mathematics, and computer science see “Recursion,”
in WIKIPEDIA, (July 13, 2005) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursion. Recursion crops up
in other legal applications, including the theory of corruption and the theory of social norms.
See, e.g., Kaushik Basu, Sudipto Battacharya, & Ajit Mishra, Notes on Bribery and the Control of
Corruption, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 349 (1992) (examining the infinite regress of bribery
enforcement, as bribery apprehenders are bribed and, in turn, bribe their own apprehenders);
Paul Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role for Law, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (describing the cooperation-supporting social norm “def-for-dev,”
a recursive and “subgame perfect” alternative to “tit-for-tat”).

Detection Avoidance

7

True to its recursive nature, the detection avoidance principle, if
prodded, unfolds in infinite regress.
Sanctioning all links in the chain simultaneously is no solution. As
explained in Part VI, sanctioning detection avoidance without regard
to whether it is once, twice, or ten times removed—one (very
hypothetical) interpretation of perjury30 and obstruction31 statutes—
actually serves to encourage detection avoidance all told.
Discouraging detection avoidance requires, in theory, that higher
“orders” of detection avoidance are sanctioned more than lower.
Intuitively, for any given order of detection avoidance, the higher
order sanction invited by the avoidance activity is its punishment, and
the lower order sanction avoided, its reward. If the punishment is to
exceed the reward, therefore, the higher order sanction must exceed
the lower. Thus, the cover up should indeed be “worse” than the
crime.32 But what is more, the cover up of the cover up should be
worse than the cover up, and the cover up of the cover up of the
cover up should be worse than the cover up of the cover up, etc…
What theory requires of sanctioning, therefore, practical policy could
never supply. Separating—in order to separately treat—different
orders of detection avoidance is hardly feasible. How, after all, is the
fact finder to tell cover up of cover up of cover up from plain old
cover up of cover up—especially when the detection avoider has an
interest in making higher orders seem like lower?
Indeed, what the law in fact does with sanctions—some indication of
what is practicable—is the opposite. The Federal Sentencing

E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 1515, 1519, 1520. There are several other sources of direct
sanction. These include: (1) Contempt (E.g., 18 U.S.C §§ 401) which may, for example,
result from a party’s failure to obey a court order, such as a motion to compel discovery.
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D), (a); (2) Monetary sanctions under procedural rules in the
form of payments by the party to the court or to the opponent, sometimes in the form of
reimbursement for attorneys’ fees. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (authorizing the court to
“make such order in regard to the failure as are just” including explicitly the payment of
attorneys’ fees and presumably additional payments as well); (3) Sanctions imposed by
exercise of the court’s “inherent power.” See, e.g., Cappellupo v. FMC Corp, 126 F.R.D. 545,
553 (D. Minn. 1989) (document destruction sanctioned by requiring payment of twice the
other side’s expenditures resulting therefrom).
32 See, e.g., Frank Rick, We’re not in Watergate Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at A12 (“the
most basic lesson of Watergate: the cover-up is worse than the crime”); David Johnston,
Cover-up: Watergate’s Toughest Lesson, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, at A5 (“Watergate bequeathed
many things to history, including this famous cliche: The cover-up is worse than the crime.
Politicians haven't necessarily absorbed this lesson, but the legal system has.”); William
Safire, One Blow for Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1986, at A35 (“As usual in matters of state, the
cover-up is worse than the crime.”); Henry Weinstein, Martha Stewart Convicted: A Cover Again
Proves Worse Than the Initial Act, L.A. TIMES, Mar., 6, 2004, at C1 (“[Martha Stewart’s
conviction] is another example of a person being trapped by their effort to conceal
information that could show criminal conduct, rather than the conduct itself.” (quoting
Professor Stephen Gillers))
30
31
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Guidelines suggests a lower sanction for higher orders of avoidance,33
thus rewarding avoidance more than it is penalized. To the same
effect are rules and practices that punish detection avoidance by in
effect increasing the chance of sanction for the underlying wrong—
procedural devices like burden shifting,34 adverse jury instructions,35
or a policy of responding to obstructive behavior by intensifying
investigation of the underlying violation.36 To wit, an increase in the
chance of suffering the underlying sanction is less of a punishment
than the underlying sanction itself.
Thus, the detection avoidance principle—and specifically its
recursivity—causes serious problems for attempts to limit detection
avoidance by threat of sanction. What then should be done to
control this source of social waste? This article advocates a direct
“technological” approach. Rather than attempting to impose a legally
constructed, detection-dependent cost on detection avoidance, the
law ought to focus first on structuring evidentiary process so as to
make resources spent on detection avoidance less productive for the
detection avoider. To be sure, such technological attacks are often
included in general law enforcement strategy: consider bank vaults,
car locks, and house alarms. The point here is that the technological
attack ought to be specially emphasized in the case of detection
avoidance because of the unique inefficacy of sanctioning such
activities.
One fruitful line of technological attack involves exploiting and
exacerbating general difficulties inherent in all human endeavor. Part
VIII explains how the productivity of detection avoidance
expenditure can be reduced by designing evidentiary process
(inclusive of investigative techniques) to emphasize the psychological
limits of cognition and the sociological limits of cooperation. The
productivity of the preparatory effort necessary to construct a
consistent and detailed fabrication, for example, is reduced by
refusing private cognitive aids to the interrogated or deposed while
protecting their private use by interrogators and deposers.
See infra note 115 and surrounding text.
See, e.g., Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005) (shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant as a sanction for its stonewalling in
discovery).
35 See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988) (reviewing an
instruction suggesting to the jury that documents in the possession of a party but not turned
over by that party upon request could be inferred to be damaging to that party’s case).
Other examples of piggyback sanctions appear in FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(C), (E)
(providing that the court may take certain facts as given, refuse to hear certain claims or
defenses, refuse to admit certain evidence, strike certain pleadings, stay or dismiss part or all
of the action, or render judgment by default.)
36 See, e.g., Charles M. Carberry & Harold K. Gordon, Criminal Enforcement of Non-Fraud
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 4 BUS. CRIMES BULL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 1 (1997)
(“Securities crimes that include evidence of obstruction are …more likely to be
prosecuted.”)
33
34
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Respectively, the destruction of documents becomes a less fruitful
activity when employees and conspirators are induced to secretly
retain their own copies on the chance that these will be useful
bargaining chips in cutting separate deals with prosecutors.
In fact, such prescriptions are drawn largely from steps that the law
already takes.
And a deeper investigation of evidentiary
misconduct—one that delves below the glittering surface of news
headlines—indicates that these quieter devices continue to hum along
as the law’s core response to detection avoidance, its principal
adaptation to this central organic challenge.37 This is how it should
be, and how it should remain. To the extent that recent events
indicate a need to intensify the law’s assault on detection avoidance,
expanding and strengthening the technological impediments to its
success should be the strategy of first resort.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Part II describes
the conventional theory of public enforcement and its lopsided
emphasis on detection to the exclusion of detection avoidance. Part
III argues that detection avoidance activities are important in
practice, despite their neglect in accepted theory. Part IV proposes
an expanded framework incorporating the impact of avoidance
activities on the cost effectiveness of law enforcement. Parts V-VII
explore the relative inefficacy of sanctions in controlling detection
avoidance. Parts VIII-X describe and argue for the alternative
technological approach, identifying its quiet prevalence in the law.
Concluding remarks appear in Part XI and an appendix houses
mathematical formulations of the article’s main assertions.

II. Detection avoidance
enforcement theory

and

neoclassical

Though at the hub of practical policy considerations, detection
avoidance lies, on the scholarly map, somewhere in the no man’s land
between evidentiary procedure and public enforcement theory—a
position that may help explain why there is systematic neglect where
there should be systematic analysis. In attempting to remedy the
situation, one could take several approaches, expanding from either
disciplinary border, or from both at once. The approach taken in this
article is to start on the side of public enforcement theory,
broadening it toward evidentiary procedure.38 Accordingly, this Part

See infra note 136 and surrounding text.
On the limited role played by detection avoidance in the literature on evidentiary
procedure see Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
STAN. L. REV. 291, 294 n.10, 298, 301-306, 302 n.40 (2004) [hereinafter Sanchirico, Upside of
Cognitive Error] (describing and critiquing scholarship’s relative inattention to the Holmesian
37
38
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begins by identifying the core components of the predominant
approach to public enforcement with particular attention to its
inattention to detection avoidance. Part IV lays out a broader
framework, to be applied throughout the article.

A. Elements of the neoclassical approach
The “neoclassical” approach to public enforcement builds on the
“classical” model of crime laid out by Beccaria, Bentham and others
in the late 18th century.39 Those ancient roots were revivified,
formalized, and extended by Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker
in 1968.40 In the nearly three and a half decades since then, the
neoclassical approach to public enforcement has constituted one of
the most extensively farmed fields in law and economics.41 Such
sustained attention has produced diverse incarnations and a wide
array of implications,42 a multiformity not always recognized by
critics.
Fair to say, however, two components of the neoclassical approach
remain constant and essential. First is its account of the basic
“machinery” of deterrence. The deterrent force exerted by law is
viewed as the conjunction of two factors: the probability that
violations are “detected” (i.e., investigated, uncovered, and
successfully prosecuted) and the magnitude of the sanction imposed
on the event of detection.43 Thus, the potential wrongdoer, in
deciding whether to misreport her firm’s earnings, cheat on her taxes,
or hold up her local Seven Eleven, weighs in one pan of the balance
her perception of the private gain from the activity and, in the other,

“bad actor” of evidentiary process) and Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 1218 (“Evidence tampering [broadly defined] has been
something of a Medusa in evidence scholarship.”). See supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined. for some exceptions to this regularity .
39 CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Kenelm Foster & Jane Grigson trans.,
1964) (1764) and JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789).
40 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
41 A number of excellent surveys catalogue developments since Becker: Nuno Garoupa, The
Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURVEYS 267 (1997) (surveying modern public
enforcement theory); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law,
Including Criminal Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, eds.) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Handbook Chapter] (similar). See also
Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (B. Boukaert & G. de Geest, eds.) (2005) (surveying application of Becker’s
model to tax enforcement).
42 See, e.g., Garoupa, supra note 41; Polinsky & Shavell, Handbook Chapter, supra note 41.
43 Becker, supra note 40, at 181-185. If one accounts for the possibility of false positives, the
detection probability is replaced by the difference between the probability of (correct)
detection given illegal behavior and the probability of (incorrect) detection given legal
behavior—in other words, the degree to which illegal behavior increases the chance of
punishment. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigating and the Incentive to
Obey the Law, 5 J. L. ECON & ORG. 99 (1989).
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her perception of both the chance that she will be caught and what
will happen to her if she is.
This basic machinery of deterrence can be configured in many ways.
The size of the sanction, the nature of the sanction, and the
frequency of detection, for example, are all subject to policy choice.
The second essential component of the neoclassical approach is its
description of the cost benefit analysis that ought to be conducted in
making these policy choices. The social benefits of deterrence are
taken to be the benefits of reduced violations, including the benefits
to those who would otherwise be victimized. The costs are typically
parsed into two accounts, corresponding to the two factors in the
neoclassical approach to deterrence mechanics, as just described.
First are “detection costs,” the publicly incurred cost of investigating
and prosecuting violations, as manifest in budgeting for regulatory
enforcement divisions, police departments, and court systems.
Second are “sanctioning costs,” the cost of imposing sanctions when
violations lead to conviction or liability, including, for example, the
operating costs and opportunity costs of keeping convicts in prison.44
As an example of the kinds of conclusions that may follow from
combining these two components, consider Becker’s famous
prescription for efficient enforcement.45 A monetary fine, he
explains, is merely a transfer of resources from the offender to the
government (which may in turn transfer the resources back to
citizens in the form of spending increases or tax reductions). The
social pie being no smaller for this redistribution of slices, raising the
fine is a virtually costless means of generating additional deterrence.
Other forms of sanction, such as imprisonment, consume social
resources, positively reducing the size of the pie. Likewise, increasing
the chance that violations are detected diverts labor and capital
toward investigation and prosecution and away from productive
activities. Best then to lower detection effort, only rarely catching
offenders, and compensate by imposing large fines upon those few
who are caught.46

The cost of precautions taken by private citizens—alarm systems, private security
guards—constitutes a third category of cost. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 40, at 172, 200-201;
Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions
Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995); C. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public
Safety, 5 J. URBAN ECON. 388 (1978); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft:
Private versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991); Ian Ayres &
Steven D. Levitt Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precautions: An Empirical
Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q. J. ECON. 43 (1998).
45 Becker, supra note 40, at 180-183.
46 A more general prescription—that sanctions, even if costly, should be increased and the
detection probability lowered—applies as well if the cost elasticity of sanctions is no greater
than one, a special case of which is where the cost is a fixed multiple of the sanction. A
44
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Qualifying Becker’s prescription has been one of the chief tasks of
neoclassical enforcement theory in Becker’s wake.47 As a result, the
prescription survives as more of an important theoretical baseline
than a practical policy recommendation. Nevertheless, the general
framework within which Becker made his finding—the basic detectand-sanction mechanic that he deployed and the particular social cost
accounts that he chose to tally—continues to predominate.48

B. Where’s the mouse?
One can raise important foundational questions about the core
components of the neoclassic approach—and many have.49 It would
seem difficult to argue, however, that the approach does not
successfully accomplish what it sets out to do, insofar as that goes—
that it is not, in other words, a sufficiently thorough and systematic
treatment of both deterrence mechanics and the attendant social cost
accounting.

special case of this is where the cost is zero. Id. at 180, 183 (1968) (assuming proportional
costs).
47 A nonexclusive list includes Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and
Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217 (1993)
(finding that lowering the fine and perhaps raising the detection probability facilitates
imposition of effectively separate expected sanctions according to individuals’ heterogeneous
ability to avoid detection, thus preventing over or under deterrence); Lucian Arye Bebchuk
& Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability
of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992) (finding that increasing the sanction multiplies
the effect of individuals’ errors in judging the probability of detection and thus exacerbates
under and over deterrence.); Daniel Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83
VA. L. REV. 349, 351-352 (1997) (“Under the standard view…it may sometimes seem
efficient to rely more heavily on a severe penalty than on a high probability of
conviction…But if individuals infer widespread criminality from a low probability of
apprehension, the power of social influence could more than offset any efficiency gains from
this tradeoff.”); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That
Definitely Are Undesirable,” 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1992) (extending Polinsky & Shavell
infra to show how the presence of offender risk bearing costs may raise the optimal level of
deterrence); A Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 880 (1979) (incorporating the additional risk
bearing costs borne by risk averse offenders when sanctions are increased); George J. Stigler,
The Optimal Enforcement of Laws, 728 J. POL. ECON. 526 (focusing on cross offense incentives,
and maintaining that if all fines are set to the same maximum level, offenders will choose
serious rather than minor offenses, at least if detection probabilities cannot be appropriately
adjusted across offenses).
48 Garoupa, supra note 41; Polinsky & Shavell, Handbook Chapter, supra note 41.
49 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 47, at 351-352 (critiquing the classic paradigm’s neglect of law’s
role in influencing social norms as well as its interaction with individuals’ own expression of
character and values); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW (1978) (seminally advancing a retributive approach to criminal law); Robinson
& Darley, supra note 23, at 174, 175-197 (2004) (critiquing the cognitive premises of the
classic deterrence paradigm, including potential offenders’ knowledge of the law, their
correct perception of costs and benefits, and their ability to rationally decide); Chris William
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001)
(critiquing the premise that legal rules should be set solely on the basis of aggregate social
costs and benefits without regard to how those are distributed).
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But that is what is argued here. For almost without exception
neoclassical enforcement theory depicts the detection of violations as
a one-sided affair. The state as detector decides how much to invest
in apprehension and the more it invests the more likely it is to
successfully detect violations. The detected has no active role in the
story.
Yet listen a moment to the informed impressions of litigators and
judges,50 skim a few administrative policy pronouncements,51 go so

Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1995) (quoting Federal District Judge
Marvin H. Shoob: “people would be shocked if it were truly known how many witnesses lied
under oath in a court of law every day.”); id. at 70 (quoting Milwaukee prosecutor E. Michael
McCann, former chair of the ABA Section of Criminal Justice: “if perjury were water, the
people in civil court would be drowning.”); id. (quoting a prominent trial judge as saying that
perjury “is so widespread and pervasive that it has become a major concern among trial
judges”); id. (quoting a state trial judge as saying: “I think there is an element out there
beginning to realize that you can walk into court, take the oath, lie up a storm, and not have
to worry about being punished for it, even if you are caught.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN
AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON 147 (1999) (“[i]t is not unusual for one judge to say to another that he or she has
just presided at a trial at which several of the witnesses were obviously lying.”); Richard H.
Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J.
776, 813 (1993) (“All guilty defendants who choose to testify will lie on the stand about
anything that might improve their chances and about which they imagine they can be
persuasive.”). GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
ix (“Many litigators privately confided to us that, at some point in their careers, they
suspected or were confronted with the fact that documents were deliberately
destroyed…Public confirmation …was not hard to find.”); id. at § 18.1, 381 (“[p]ersons
under investigation for tax violations often... panic and take steps to ‘fix’ the case against
them by [evidence tampering]”); MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE:
SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION xi (2000)
(“Spoliation of evidence is an unfortunate reality of modern-day civil litigation.”);
Beckstrom, Destruction of Documents with Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 687,
715 (1966) (“[W]illful document destruction in antitrust settings has been revealed in a
number of cases, and…it is reasonable to speculate that, as with an iceberg, this is only a
sample of what is below the surface.”); Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former
Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 817-18 (2002) (arguing as a former Assistant U.S.
Attorney that witness cooperators often lie to police); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New
Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an
Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 794 (1993)
(“The general consensus is that misconduct is widespread during discovery.”); Nesson, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 793 (“Interviews and surveys of litigators suggest
[that spoliation is] a prevalent practice.”); Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to
Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 353 (1995) (“Destruction or spoliation of
evidence in civil litigation has undermined the integrity of the adversary system.”); Dale A.
Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant
Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1983) (“The naked truth is that many corporations
purposefully operate programs to destroy evidence.”); Harris, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 1777 (“[P]erjury in the courtrooms continues to skyrocket seemingly out of
control.”); Laura Mansnerus, Lying Rampant in Civil Suits, but Prison for Lying Is Rare, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at A22 (“[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is
rampant....”); Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a
Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
687, 710-11 (2000) (providing advice on how to prevent seemingly inevitable tampering by
the other side).
51 See discussion of the Corporate Fraud Task Force surrounding supra notes 13-18.
50
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far as to examine what systematic data exists,52 or even just glance at
the occasional newspaper headline,53 and it becomes difficult to avoid
the conclusion that violators are more than mere spectators. Just as
the state invests in detecting their violations, they invest in avoiding
that detection. They lie, they shred, they bribe. They refrain from
taking notes. They go out of their way to communicate only orally,
in person, in private. They wear gloves and masks. They work under
cover of darkness. They open foreign bank accounts. They form
offshore entities. They launder tainted money. They launder bloody
socks.
The investigation and prosecution of crimes and regulatory violations
is not, in fact, an exercise in orienteering. It is a chase, consisting of a
pursuit and a flight.
Amidst the numerous contributions to neoclassical theory spanning
several decades and several fields of legal studies, this fundamental
fact manifests in but a few brief, isolated flashes. One of the only
systematic accounts is provided in a fifteen year old paper by
Professor Arun Malik, who recognizes that detection avoidance costs
provide (yet another) qualification to Becker’s prescription that fines
should be large and detection probabilities small.54 Raising the fine
may not incur the expenditure of additional public resources on
detection, as Becker pointed out. But, says Malik, it most definitely
inspires the expenditure of additional private resources on detection
avoidance especially among those who remain undeterred. To raise the
52 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM L &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 551 (2005) (studying more than 350 criminal exonerations from 1989 to
2003, finding most from rape and murder convictions, and stating: “For murder, the leading
cause of the false convictions we know about is perjury—including perjury by supposed
participants or eyewitnesses to the crime who knew the innocent defendants in advance.”).
Survey data includes: Steven D. Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report and
Preliminary Findings 3 (1983) (finding that 50% of surveyed litigators view “unfair or
inadequate disclosure” as either a frequent or regular problem); Steven D. Pepe, Summary of
Selected Findings of the Study on the Standards of Legal Negotiations 16 (date unknown)
(same); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 790 (1980) (finding based on survey data that it
is “difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of evasive practices or their adverse impact on
the efficiency and effectiveness (for information distribution) of civil discovery. Evasion
infects every kind of litigation and frustrates lawyers in every kind of practice.”); id. (finding
that surveyed litigators believed “lack of candor or bad faith by the opposing party or
attorney,” impeded discovery in 14 percent of their cases on average); Richard O. Arther &
John E. Reid, Utilizing Lie Detector Techniques to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 213, 215 (1954) (finding that 90 percent of parties
in a large sample of paternity suits admitted after trial that they lied under oath when
subsequently confronted with a lie detector test); Alan R. Beckenstein & H. Landis Gabel,
Antitrust Compliance: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 459 (1982) (more
than half of survey respondents say that they often or always encounter “policies that reduce
historical records.”). But see, Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined. at 1231-1239 (critiquing these studies and their use in legal scholarship).
53 See, e.g., supra notes 19-21 and surrounding text (discussing the Andersen, Stewart, and
Quattrone cases).
54 Malik, supra note 24, at 341-348 (formally proving this caveat in Proposition 1(iii)).
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fine is to increase the pain of detection and, therefore, to increase the
relief from avoiding it. Were the fine $100,000, reducing the chance
of detection by one percentage point would be worth (roughly)
$1000.55 Doubling the fine to $200,000 (roughly) doubles that value
to $2000.
In fact, Malik does little to develop the point beyond providing this
additional caveat to Becker.56 He does not consider policies that
attempt to deter detection avoidance itself—the subject of this
article.57 He does not recognize the recursivity of the detection
avoidance principle (the focus of Parts V-VII). And he does not
examine the potential for shaping detection activities to reduce the
productivity of detection avoidance (the focus of Part VIII).58 Of
course, none of this was incumbent upon Malik himself, who
probably deserves more credit for raising an important and neglected
issue. The real problem is that the otherwise well developed body of
literature that follows in the decade and a half since Malik has also
declined to develop his initial insight, effectively relegating it to an
occasionally footnoted nubbin. For the most part, neoclassic
enforcement theory has continued to ignore detection avoidance,
even as it strenuously refines and extends its one-sided approach.59

Throughout the rest of the article it will be assumed in all numerical examples that the
violator is risk neutral. We will also speak of percentage point changes as if there were
greater precision than there actually is. Both practices are purely for ease of exposition.
56 But see infra note 95 describing ancillary results in Malik’s article.
57 This may explain the rather limited set of examples of detection avoidance that Malik
provides—the use of radar detectors and lobbying for lax enforcement of environmental
regulations—neither of which are per se sanctionable.
58 Malik explicitly assumes that state policy has no effect on the productivity of detection
avoidance. Malik, supra note 24, at 343 (assuming relevant cross derivative to be zero in
equation (5) and surrounding text).
59 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, Handbook Chapter, supra note 41 (surveying enforcement theory
and citing Malik’s article in passing without discussion of its content); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000)
(same). But see, Garoupa, supra note 41 (surveying of public enforcement theory and
presenting Malik’s caveat as a formal proposition). Lexis and Westlaw searches indicate that
Malik’s article has been cited in only about a half a dozen law review articles, and always only
in passing. Half of these citing articles are by the same author. Among the very few articles
outside the law review literature that account for detection avoidance activities are Innes,
supra note 24 (arguing that a self-reporting regime can lower detection avoidance costs
without compromising deterrence, if sanctions on self-reported violations are set equal to
the violator’s all-in effective sanction, including detection avoidance costs) and Choi &
Sanchirico, supra note 24 (arguing that defendant’s litigation effort (akin to detection
avoidance costs) reverses the usual optimality of “decoupling” of defendants’ liability and
plaintiffs’ recovery in high stakes cases with deep pocket defendants).
Somewhat related to the problem of detection avoidance is the general literature on selfreporting of violations, including in part: Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583 (1994) (arguing that selfreporting can lower both enforcement costs and risk-bearing costs); Jennifer Arlen, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (analyzing
the problem of vicarious corporate criminal liability and the incentive to monitor employees,
and advocating conditioning fines on monitoring effort); Jennifer Arlen & Renier Kraakman,
Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L REV 687
55
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III. The empirical importance of detection
avoidance costs
In attempting to defend the conventional one-sided approach to
enforcement, one might argue that the social costs of detection
avoidance are negligible in practice and therefore justifiably ignored.
This Part counters that assertion.
The counterargument proceeds simultaneously in two modes. The
first addresses the significance of these costs head on, arguing that
they are indeed substantial in an absolute sense, aside from
comparison with other relevant costs.
The second mode of argument is a form of estoppel. The
conventional enforcement paradigm relies heavily on the significance
of the public cost of detection. Safe to say, were that cost taken as
negligible, most of the findings in the literature would be upturned.
(Becker’s prescription of high fines and low detection probabilities is
not unique in this regard). But the social cost of detection avoidance
parallels that of detection. Just as the public consumes social
resources detecting violations, the offender consumes social
resources avoiding detection. The state uncovers, the offender
covers up.
Indeed, the state’s pursuit of violations is costly largely because of,
and to the extent that, the offender incurs costs in the flight.
Detecting violations requires the expenditure of public resources
commensurate with the offender’s counterbalancing expenditure
avoiding detection. If culprits turned themselves in, if taxpayers
noted on their returns how they had understated their income,
detection would be virtually cost-free. The cat would burn few
calories, that is, but for the calories burned by the mouse.
The remainder of this Part supports these claims with a more detailed
analysis of the nature and extent of detection avoidance costs.
Although systematic empirical evidence on the relative cost of

(1997) (extending Arlen’s model to the problem of inducing firms to monitor employee
activities that may have harmful environmental consequences, and also considering dutybased regimes and self-reporting); Chris William Sanchirico & Alexander S. P. Pfaff,
Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovering and Correcting Environmental
Harm, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 189 (2000) (analyzing the problem of optimally inducing firms
to investigate their own potential violations given the positive impact of such investigation
on the chance such violations will be detected); Robert Innes, Self-Policing and Optimal Law
Enforcement When Violator Remediation Is Valuable, 7 J. POL. ECON. 1305 (1999) (emphasizing
the problem that firms have insufficient incentive to remediate violations unless and until
those violations are detected by the regulator, and proposing making fines contingent on the
firm’s pre-detection remediation costs).
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detection avoidance is hard to come by,60 the best evidence available
strongly suggests that we are dealing here with a formidable rodent.

A. The Andersen briefs
Lawyers often bat around the term “zealous advocacy” with little
indication of where precisely they would locate the foul line between
legal and illegal (not to mention the line between ethical and
unethical). And in general lawyers and their clients have little reason
to be specific.
Yet the Arthur Andersen case,61 as it rose to the U.S. Supreme Court
from the courts below, staked out a border that apparently left many
lawyers standing in foul territory. As a result, the case flushed out
some surprisingly candid claims regarding the ubiquity of various
detection avoidance activities. Reading these briefs, one is tempted
to conclude that avoiding detection is the daily task of the entire
defense bar.
According to the amicus brief of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL),62 the 5th circuit’s reading of the
obstruction statute63 made it criminal to impede a government
investigation. The NACDL reacted to this as if they were the
National Association of Bakers and the 5th circuit had interpreted the
law to prohibit mixing flour and water. “Impede government
investigations?” was the plea. “That’s what we do.” The 5th circuit’s
ruling, said the NACDL, “disregards the traditional role of lawyers,
which includes a duty to protect their clients by deflecting potential
government investigations.”64 Similarly, according to the amicus brief

60 See Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 12301239 (reviewing empirical evidence on the prevalence of evidentiary foul play).
61 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
62 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of
Petitioner, Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (No. 04-368),
available as 2005 WL 435903.
63 Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), reversed and remanded
by 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
64 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of
Petitioner at 2, Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (No. 04-368),
available as 2005 WL 435903. See also, id. at 1-2 (“When a lawyer represents a client in
connection with a potential government investigation, one of the lawyer’s goals may
appropriately be to prevent the government from developing evidence against the client.
Within the bounds of ethics and the law, that is what lawyers do.”); id. at 8 (“[I]nevitably in
the practice of law a zealous advocate will devise and execute legitimate strategies intended,
at least in part, to deflect an investigation. In essence, that is a lawyer’s job.”); id. at 21-22
(“[T]he lower court’s reading of the statute intrudes deeply into the day-to-day practice of
law…Lawyers review draft documents for their clients all the time. They routinely
recommend revising or deleting inflammatory, pejorative, or potentially incriminating
language, often, at least in part, to limit exposure in the event of a possible future
government investigation.”). See also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1288 (1975) cited in NACDL brief (“Within the limits of professional propriety,
causing delay and sowing confusion not only are [an attorney’s] right but may be his duty.");
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of the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL), “an
attorney may need to give her client advice that, if followed, would
result in testimony, a document, or a record being withheld from an
official proceeding or that would result in the testimony of a witness
being influenced. That is an attorney’s job.”65 Whether the U.S.
Supreme Court would go quite so far is uncertain from its opinion in
the Andersen case, wherein the only examples of legitimately
impeding government investigations concern the assertion of
privileges and the question-begging “compl[iance] with a valid
document retention policy under ordinary circumstances”66 [emphasis
added]. But it seems clear at least from these briefs that litigators
themselves go at least so far in daily practice.
The NACDL boasts 12,200 members.67 The SEC has approximately
4000 full time positions with 1000 full time staff in its enforcement
division.68 In laying down the full social cost of enforcement—on
however abstract a basis—what could justify counting what 4000
government lawyers do to investigate, but not what 12,200 defense
lawyers do to impede that investigation?69

B. The Cost of “Retaining” Documents
One thing a lawyer might do to avoid detection is help clients destroy
the evidentiary emissions of violations. Much of this activity is likely
to be sub rosa and its full magnitude difficult to gauge. But some
destructive activity is not sanctionable (or at least not clearly so), and
its relative openness provides another opportunity to glimpse at least
a portion of the costs of detection avoidance.
If a firm destroys documents with an eye toward impeding a
particular government investigation, it exposes itself to prosecution
for obstruction of justice, as well as a host of potential evidentiary
and procedural sanctions.70 If, however, a firm destroys documents
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5 (1985) cited in NACDL brief
(“[T]his is the central theme of the white-collar crime defense function, the defense attorney
works to keep potential evidence out of government reach by controlling access to
information.”); JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 12 (2001) cited in
NACDL brief (“[T]he challenges facing defense counsel are ... limiting, consistent with
ethical and legal constraints, government access to incriminating evidence…”).
65 Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Council of Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner at
6, Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (No. 04-368), available as
2005 WL 435901. See also id. at 2 (“Lawyers representing corporations or individuals often
give advice or take action designed to protect their client yet impede the fact-finding ability
of a government investigation.”)
66 Arthur Andersen, 125 S. Ct. at 2129, n. 8 and surrounding text.
67 http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/WhoWeAre?OpenDocument (last visited
March 28, 2005).
68 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT, 15, 142 (2003).
69 The comparison is, of course, imprecise; yet telling.
70 Cappellupo v. FMC Corp, 126 F.R.D. 545, 553 (D. Minn. 1989) (document destruction
sanctioned by requiring payment of twice the other side’s expenditures resulting therefrom);
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with no particular investigation in its sights, that destruction will
typically not trigger sanction, even if the destroyed documents turn
out to be the missing link in a future enforcement action.71
Precisely how out of focus the future investigation must be in order
to shield the firm from punishment is unsettled. But it appears that
one way to produce the requisite disconnectedness is to institute an
ongoing program of document destruction, with the semblance of
routine house cleaning, one whose detection avoidance goals are
diluted by the correlated and not entirely implausible desire to manage
the expense of document storage.72
Although systematic empirical evidence tends to be scarce, and where
available, somewhat stale, such “document retention policies” appear
to be prevalent.73 Important for our purposes, they also appear to be
expensive. Ironically, given the state of the literature on public
enforcement, the chief expense is not in drafting the policy, but in
enforcing it.
Presumably, few firms promote on the basis of how well an
employee complies with its document policy; few bonuses reflect a
job well done in this regard. More likely, routine instructions to
comply with the firm’s document retention policy sit long untended
on employees too long list of low priority things to do. Had it been
otherwise at Credit Suisse First Boston, after all, Frank Quattrone

Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th
Cir. 1985) (similar)
71 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, n. 8 and surrounding text (2005);
Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988) (reviewing a spoliation
instruction issued in response to document destruction).
72 Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112.
73 GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., § 8.2, at 276
("The vast majority of large business enterprises now has some formal documentmanagement program." (citing John M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention
and Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5 (1980)));
Oesterle, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1185-86 (“[M]any corporations
purposefully operate programs to destroy evidence... primarily to reduce litigation
’exposure.’”); Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of
the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1183 (“The routine destruction of documents,
often accomplished through formal ‘document management’ programs, has become
commonplace.” (citing AM. SOC'Y OF CORP. SEC'YS, INC., SURVEY OF RECORDS RETENTION
PRACTICES 2 (1971))). Document retention programs are often the subject of articles in the
practice literature. See generally GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., app. A (providing sample policies); id. app. B (same); KOESEL ET AL., supra
note 50, at 16-26 (discussing the importance of documentation retention policies and
providing advice on how to implement them); Fedders & Guttenplan, supra (providing
general advice on document retention policies); Donald S. Skupsky, Discovery and Destruction of
E-Mail, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL
ISSUES 47-59 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed., 1996) (discussing how e-mail messages are stored and
can be used against the author, making recommendations about how to handle e-mail).
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would have had no need to forward the email (“time to clean up
those files”) that led to his conviction for obstruction.74
Indeed, to the extent that employees would, without prodding, give
document retention policies a first thought, this is likely to be
immediately accompanied by second thoughts. Leaving document
clean up a permanent item on the to do list might not seem like such
a bad idea, given a modicum of foresight about the fact that, in future
states of the world where such documents become important, the
employee’s interests may not always line up with those of the firm.
Thus, while a midlevel manager may urge her subordinates to shred
documents, she may decide to keep a choice collection in her own
personal files, anticipating the possibility of later trading these for
leniency with prosecutors and regulators.
How do firms manage this costly private enforcement problem?
Some firms place certain of their employees in charge of enforcing
their retention policies. Salary then goes to an employee who is not
engaged in the underlying productive activity of the firm. Should
cost cutting become imperative, such employees are more likely to be
let go or reassigned. Thus, “early [in 2000], to cut costs, Andersen
dismissed some employees who handled…shredding, and paper
began stacking up. By June [2001], accountants handling Enron in
Houston were virtually buried in documents that, under [Andersen’s
document retention] policy, should have been shredded long
before.”75
Other firms make document destruction a periodic event, like the
company picnic. Chip manufacturer Rambus Inc. allegedly held an
annual “shredding day,” whereon employees were provided with
burlap sacks and on at least one occasion pizza, beer, and
champagne.76 The question arises, what weren’t employees doing
while they were busy shredding, chewing, and sipping?
Still other firms hire third party auditors. A thriving business has
grown up around the problem of enforcing document retention
policies. The advertising tag: “it’s one thing to have a policy; it’s
another to implement and audit it.”77 The “news release” issued by
one company, Forensicon, is particularly enlightening:

See supra note 21.
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of the Government’s Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2002, at A1.
76 Bloomberg News, Lawyer: Rambus Shredded Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at C2
(describing allegations of lawyer for Rambus’ litigation opponent)
77 Forensicon, Document Retention Policies: Lessons from Andersen: e-Mail Reveals! available at
http://www.forensicon.com/pdfs/article_documentretention.pdf (last visited March 30,
2005)
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Preventive maintenance, including the education and training of
employees on the policy, is essential to ensure the policy is enforced.
“We work with management and counsel to test the effectiveness of the
policy by conducting periodic searches of the data environment to see
whether or not anything of interest turns up. If something is found,
counsel and the client discuss the ramifications and develop a strategy
for dealing with that data or problematic behavior before anything gets
to the point of litigation, so that the firm is protected and doesn’t
incriminate itself by keeping needlessly files that it has a right to dispose
of…If you have a policy, you need to audit it” Neubecker [Forsenicon’s
President] explains. “If you say these are things you do and don’t do in
email, how do you know employees are following the policy?...You need
to periodically pull in a third party firm to audit your adherence to your
communications policies. Recent events and trends suggest that as firms
get slapped with lawsuits, business leaders will appreciate the value of
managing this risk. Insurance rates are going to go up, and eventually
companies will be required to enforce and audit their document
retention policies with third party risk management firms in conjunction
with attorneys.”78

Thus, effective document destruction costs quite a bit more than the
electricity used to power the shredder, its chief costs inuring to
enforcement.
How odd then that while the conventional
enforcement paradigm carefully counts the costs of having the SEC
acquire and sift through private firms’ documents, it does not count
the firm’s cost of shifting through and destroying documents as part
of its private cost of detection avoidance.

C. Correction v. Cover-up at the Eleventh Hour
Sometimes document retention policies are insufficiency
comprehensive, or are allowed to lapse, in which case some last
minute evidence destruction may be attempted. Such last minute
destruction also entails social costs, though of a different kind from
the cost of “retention” policies.
Emergency destruction comes at a time of crisis where each moment
counts. Instead of trying to prevent a bad outcome, the individual
diverts attention to avoiding blame. When her ability to prevent a
crisis is possible but uncertain, the individual has a difficult choice to
make: buckle down, or cover up.
Arthur Andersen chose to cover up. According to the Government’s
brief in Opposition before the Supreme Court:
[Andersen’s] Enron auditors were instructed to make compliance with
the document policy a priority despite the mounting time pressure
they faced in dealing with Enron’s accounting problems. As a
result, the Enron engagement team made an unprecedented effort to
destroy non-workpaper documents. Documents were shredded on-site

78

Id.
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and also were shipped to petitioner’s main office for bulk shredding. A
chart showing the quantity of materials shipped for shredding during
2001 reveals the extraordinary spike in physical document destruction
that coincided with petitioner’s discovery of the SEC inquiry….In
addition to the destruction of hard copies of documents, tens of
thousands of e-mails and other electronic documents were deleted,
representing at least a three-fold increase over usual activity.79 [emphasis
added]

D. Evidence Non-creation
Another way to avoid detection is to avoid creating the evidence in
the first place. “’Don’t put it in writing’ is advice lawyers give every
day—to protect clients from creating documents that may be used, or
often misused, to their detriment.”80 Lawyers reportedly encourage
clients to follow the “New York Times rule:” “Before writing
something down, consider how it would look on the front page of
the New York Times.”81 Union Pacific, facing litigation arising from
accidents at train crossings, instructs its claims investigators that “no
useful purpose is served by extensively documenting evidence.”82
The litigation consulting firm LitigationProofing LLC lists among the
“seven deadly sins of business email:” “Not considering how it would
look in the newspaper….guaranteeing, leaking sensitive information,
[and] carrying on a debate.”83
Evidence non creation is also costly. People create records for a
reason. The unaided human mind is in many respects not particularly
impressive, and certainly not up to the task of running an enterprise
(legitimate or otherwise) in the modern world. Fortunately, after
several centuries of failure and reflection, the mind has been at least
impressive enough to develop clever methods of compensating for
its shortcomings. These methods often involve the keeping of
records to aid the working and long term memory.84
Records are also often the byproduct of devices, like email, that
facilitate communication. Email and paper correspondence remove
the inconvenient necessity of physical proximity from the activity of
communication. And having a record of what was said facilitates

Brief for the United States in Opposition Petitioner at 7, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (No. 04-368), available as 2004 WL 2825876.
80 Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A23.
81 See, e.g., Jack V. Auspitz & Susan E. Quinn, Litigators’ View of Due Diligence, 1368 PLI/Corp
107, 173 (2003) cited in NACDL Andersen brief; Ellis R. Mirsky, Managing the Litigation Process,
407 PLI/Lit 9, 30 (1991) cited in NACDL Andersen brief.
82 Walt Bogdanich, In Deaths at Rail Crossings, Missing Evidence and Silence, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2004, at A1.
83 Porus P. Cooper, Lawyers sifting clients’ e-mail can alter case results, PHIL. INQ., June 2, 2005 at
C1(?).
84 See generally, Sanchirico, Upside of Cognitive Error, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 355-363 (describing use of cognitive artifacts)
79

Detection Avoidance

23

coordination by preventing misunderstandings (either actual or the ex
post pretense thereof).
Such records, however, are the stuff of evidence. The proverbial
“paper trail” is often a trail of mental crutches.85 Martha Stewart and
her broker, for instance, were convicted largely on the basis of phone
logs and worksheets.86
As a result, individuals face a dilemma, one that affects even
legitimate activities. Not knowing or caring to focus constant
attention on whether any given set of notes will end up as, or lead to
damaging evidence, the individual too broadly refrains from
recordation. Consequently, she and her team function at a lower
level than they otherwise would. She cannot remember the details of
the meeting. And the documents she prepared must be revised again
to reflect what she forgot. Not having written down her promise to
perform a task—lest arrival of a better opportunity made breach
worthwhile—she forgets to complete a part of the project that she
agreed to orally and now must return her equipment to the job site
after the customer complains.

E. Lying
Records—in their systematic ongoing destruction, their destruction
in crisis mode at the eleventh hour, or their non-creation in the first
place—may well be the locus for significant detection avoidance
costs. But what about lying? Perhaps good old fashioned deception
is at last an example of a common act of detection avoidance that is
much less costly to perpetrate than to penetrate. After all, lying is
easy. First you fill your lungs. Then you say something false. In
contrast, to detect that someone else is lying requires extensive
research and intensive preparation.

Id.
Superseding Indictment, at 7, United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)
(S1
03
Cr.
717
(MGC)),
available
at
http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb10504sind.pdf (“On December 27, 2001,
at approximately 10:04 a.m. (EST), within minutes after being informed of the sale and
attempted sale of the Waksal Shares, PETER BACANOVIC called MARTHA STEWART.
After being told that STEWART was in transit and unavailable, BACANOVIC left a
message, memorialized by STEWART’s assistant, that 'Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is
going to start trading downward.”). In addition, the ImClone CEO’s phone log for later that
same day reads, “Martha Stewart something is going on with ImClone and she wants to
know what ....” Samuel Waksal’s December 27, 2001 Message Log,
http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/swms122701msglog.html.;
Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Stewart, at 16 (“[One week before the phone message,
Bacanovic] printed a ‘worksheet’ that listed each of the stocks held by Martha Stewart at
Merrill Lynch, including ImClone .... Bacanovic made handwritten notes in blue ballpoint ink
on the Worksheet concerning transactions and planned transactions in Stewart's account ....
Bacanovic made no notes on the Worksheet regarding any purported decision to sell
Stewart's ImClone shares at $60 per share.”); see also infra note 304 (discussing the
allegation that Bacanovic later penned in “@60”).

85
86

Detection Avoidance

24

But this contrast is misleading. The act with which to compare lie
detection is not lying per se. It is lying undetected. And lying
undetected requires at least as much effort as successfully detecting a
lie. All the loose ends that the lie detector might pull to unravel the
lie must be anticipated and sewn up ahead of time by the liar. If the
lie detector will ferret out witnesses with contradictory accounts, the
liar must visit them first. If the lie detector will comb the liar’s
account for internal inconsistencies, the liar must do the same with
her anticipated account. If the lie detector will investigate whether
the liar’s account is consistent with the state of the world at the time
of purported events—with train schedules, sight lines, distances—
then the liar must pre-investigate the same in crafting her lie.87 Safe
to say, therefore, that for every hour of effort logged by the lie
detector, at least one hour is logged by the successful liar.

IV. A broader theoretical framework
Recognizing that enforcement is a two-sided affair has a profound
impact on both of the core components of the neoclassical approach
to public enforcement.88 And it is helpful to lay these effects out
systematically before proceeding to a more specific comparison of
policy alternatives. This Part describes first the effect on deterrence
mechanics and then the effect on social cost accounting. It
concludes with a discussion of how enforcement policies ought to be
compared within the broader framework thus constructed. (The
article’s appendix contains a mathematical account of the analysis to
follow.)

A. The effect of detection avoidance on
deterrence mechanics
Under the conventional neoclassical approach, the degree to which
underlying violations are deterred depends on the sanction and the
detection probability.
Detection avoidance complicates this
machinery in several ways.
Firstly, and most obviously, detection avoidance activities reduce the
probability that underlying violations will be detected. To this extent,
such activities reduce the law’s deterrent force.
But, secondly, detection avoidance activities are costly for those who
engage in them, and such costs must be counted as part of the
effective sanction for the underlying violation. Time and effort spent

See generally, Sanchirico, Upside of Cognitive Error, supra note 38, at 317-344 (describing the
cognitive difficulty of successfully fabricating witness testimony).
88 See supra Part II.A.
87
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covering up improper corporate self-dealing, for example, is time and
effort not spent entering new markets or developing new products—
or playing golf for that matter. From the self-dealer’s perspective
there is little difference between a dollar of sanction for self-dealing
and a dollar spent avoiding that sanction. Both are costs of selfdealing. Thus, although detection avoidance activities reduce the
probability that self-dealing will be detected, the resulting reduction
in deterrence is mitigated by the self-dealer’s additional detection
avoidance costs.89
Thirdly, adding detection avoidance to the story raises the possibility
that it itself can be sanctioned. Later parts of the article cast doubt
on whether sanctioning detection avoidance deters detection
avoidance itself. The question here is whether it helps to deter the
underlying violation, and the answer is yes. Penalizing obstruction, for
example, imposes upon the corporate self-dealer another cost—a
legally constructed, probabilistic cost—of avoiding detection. As
with the direct costs of detection avoidance activities, discussed above,
this legally constructed cost counteracts the fact that detection
avoidance reduces the detection probability for self-dealing. Again,
the self dealer is being forced to pay for activities that reduce the
probability that the underlying violation will be detected. Here the
payment is in terms of the risk of obstruction penalties, rather than
the direct costs of these activities.90

Given that these first two effects are countervailing, how do they compare in magnitude?
Statements can be made for the case in which the violator is perfectly rational, and perhaps
some of these can be extrapolated. Taken as a whole the net effect of the rational violator’s
detection avoidance must be to lower her effective sanction. The dollar value of the
reduction in the probability of detection (the first effect described in the text) must exceed
what she is spending on that reduction (the second effect). Otherwise, she could do better
by doing nothing to avoid detection. Marginal changes from her chosen amount of
detection avoidance expenditure, however, will have no impact on the effective sanction.
The two effects described in the text will precisely balance. A violator who minimizes the
effective sanction will choose her level of detection avoidance at a point where the marginal
cost of detection avoidance equals its marginal benefit—where each additional dollar of
detection avoidance buys a dollar’s worth of reduction in the probability of detection. Were
this not so, the violator could marginally adjust her detection avoidance expenditure (up or
down) and affirmatively lower the effective sanction, contradicting that she has already
minimized that quantity. The fact that detection avoidance has no marginal impact on the
effective sanction has implications for evaluating the deterrence effects of marginal policy
changes. One might imagine that such changes have both a direct and indirect effect on
deterrence: that, for example, the increase in the effective sanction caused by increasing the
legal sanction is dampened by the additional detection avoidance that is inspired. Not so.
The two effects on deterrence of the inspired detection avoidance precisely cancel, zeroing
out the indirect effect and leaving only the direct. This is an informal statement of the socalled “envelope theorem.”
90 But note that the deterrent effect on the underlying activity from sanctioning detection
avoidance is naturally bounded. In particular, deterrence of the underlying activity cannot
exceed the sanction for the underlying activity, no matter how great the sanction on
detection avoidance. The violator could always do nothing to avoid detection and end up
paying at most the underlying sanction for her violation.
89
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Finally, accounting for detection avoidance turns detection itself into
a more complex policy variable, and, accordingly, the range of
alternative detection policies expands. Informed by neoclassical
enforcement theory, we are accustomed to thinking of detection as a
fixed probability presented to violators by the state. But with
detection avoidance in the picture violators themselves can affect the
probability of detection, at cost. And thus the state effectively
presents to the violator not a single probability of detection, but a
“menu” of detection probabilities, one for each of her possible
choices of detection avoidance intensity. By adjusting this menu, the
state can affect both the detection avoidance choices of violators and
the decision to violate the law in the first place--just as a restaurant, in
adjusting its food menu can affect both what its patrons order as well
as how many patrons it attracts. Adjusting this menu is the basic
mechanism of the technological approach, which we explore in detail
in Part VIII.91

B. The effect of detection avoidance on social
cost accounting
As discussed, the neoclassical approach focuses on the publicly
incurred cost of “detecting” underlying violations as well as the direct
social cost of sanctions like imprisonment. To these two costs, three
new costs must be added.
The first necessary addition to social costs is the private cost of
detection avoidance: expenses incurred by private parties in
hampering investigation and fighting prosecution.92 The state’s
detection activities are costly because they divert labor and capital from
other productive activities. Detection avoidance is costly for
precisely the same reason.93 The fact that detection avoidance
expenses are privately rather than publicly financed make them no
less a social cost. Consider that the social cost of violations and

As under the conventional approach to enforcement, this discussion generally abstracts
from the possibility that liability may be wrongfully imposed. But the effects identified in
the article can be regarded as the net effect on the expected sanction given commission of
the violation and the expected sanction given restraint. Consider, for example, the first
effect discussed. Detection avoidance lowers the probability of detection for both the guilty
and the innocent. But, arguably, it lowers it more for the guilty who have more to cover up.
On net, therefore, it detracts from deterrence.
92 Some activities, like harming or bribing witnesses, do double duty as detection avoidance
relative to other violations and violations in and of themselves. The analysis applies as well
to these activities with the added feature that some of the direct cost of detection avoidance
are externalities relative to the avoider’s detection avoidance decision.
93 One might claim that the social cost of detection avoidance is a substantial problem only
to the extent that deterrence of underlying violations is incomplete. This does not
distinguish it from the bulk of enforcement costs, including, e.g., the direct cost of sanctions.
Of course, neither does this conditional negligibility render detection avoidance costs any
less of a practical problem, given the condition’s practical failure.
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imprisonment—two costs most definitely counted in the neoclassical
approach—are also largely privately incurred.
The other two costs arise to the extent that detection avoidance is
itself subject to sanction. They are counterparts to the two costs—of
detection and of sanctioning—that arise in the neoclassical paradigm.
First, there is the public cost of detecting detection avoidance.
Perjury, for example, must also be investigated and prosecuted.94
Second, there is the direct cost of sanctioning detection avoidance.
When, for example, Martha Stewart spend five months in prison for
obstructing justice and lying to investigators, the costs to society
included, inter alia, the apportioned cost of operating the prison and
the opportunity cost of reducing (however slightly) Stewart’s
productivity.95

C. Comparing policy instruments
In the context of this expanded framework we ask again the question
posed by the neoclassical approach: what is the most cost effective
means of deterring law violations? Answering this question requires
evaluating the cost effectiveness of each of the several policy
instruments at our disposal, including sanctions on underlying
violations, sanctions on detection avoidance, and detection policies
like the technological approach. In evaluating each instrument, we
must consider two attributes. First, how much does the instrument
contribute toward deterrence: that is how much does it raise the
effective private cost to the potential offender of the underlying
violation. Second, how much does it contribute to social costs,

This cost is discussed in more detail in Part IX.C
Malik considers the possibility that offenders’ private benefits from underlying law
violations might be wholly or partially observable by the court, explaining that this would
enable the state to reduce detection avoidance costs. Malik, supra note 24, at 341-348. If the
court could perfectly observe the violator’s private benefits, for example, it could charge
parties the social cost of their underlying violations, unless those costs were less than the
parties’ private gains. In this case, the only individuals committing the offense would be
those whose private gains from the activity exceeded the social cost. These individuals
would not be subject to punishment, and therefore would have no need for detection
avoidance. Self-evidently, this story neglects the issue of detecting (and avoiding detection
of) the fact that the social costs from a violation exceed the violator’s private benefits.
Professor Innes proposes that detection avoidance costs can be reduced by offering
violators who self-report their violations a discounted sanction equal to slightly less than the
expected effective sanction they faced for unreported violations as affected by their
anticipated detection avoidance. Violators would take this offer, thus having no need to
avoid detection. At the same time deterrence would be essentially maintained. Innes, supra
note 24. Disclosure is such a powerful remedy in Innes’s model because, unlike other
interactions between violator and regulator, it is assumed to be immune from manipulation.
If disclosure of some violation halts or slows investigation, for example, violators might use
disclosure of small violations to cover large, in which case disclosure itself would be a mode
of detection avoidance. This is one explanation for why disclosed violations under EPA’s
self-reporting program have been disproportionately minor. Alexander Pfaff & Chris
William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of EPA’s Self-Audit Policy
23 J. POLICY ANAL. & MGMT. 415 (2004).
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whether directly or through the behavior it induces. A relatively cost
effective instrument incurs relatively low social costs per “unit” of
generated deterrence. Reciprocally, such an instrument has a large
deterrence “bang” for its social cost “buck.” 96
We have already discussed in Part II the cost effectiveness of the
policy instrument which is sanctions on the primary activity. In
particular, we have noted an important new consideration that arises
from recognizing the existence of detection avoidance, namely the
detection avoidance principle. What remains is to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of the other policy instruments identified above, namely
sanctions on detection avoidance and (the expanded range of) detection
policies. The next several Parts explore the cost effectiveness of
sanctioning detection avoidance. Part VIII turns to detection policies
that attack the technology of avoidance.

V. The recursivity of detection avoidance
At first blush, sanctioning detection avoidance seems like a promising
policy option. There will, of course, be the cost of investigating and
prosecuting yet another species of violation. But perhaps such
additional public detection costs will pay for themselves in reduced
private detection avoidance. And, to boot, sanctioning detection
avoidance will increase deterrence of the underlying violation by
raising the effective cost of perpetrating such violations. Perhaps
then sanctioning detection avoidance kills two birds with one stone
by deterring both the underlying wrong and detection avoidance
activity.
An implicit assumption underlying this optimistic suggestion is that
detection avoidance is subject to the same detect-and-sanction
mechanic as any other activity—that a sanction on detection
avoidance discourages detection avoidance just as a sanction on
robbery discourages robbery. Such is the implicit assumption of the
few commentators who consider the effects of sanctioning perjury
and obstruction.97 And to read as written the statutes governing such
process crimes, it also appears to be the implicit assumption

An instrument’s efficiency in generating deterrence will generally vary with the extent to
which it and other instruments are employed. Accordingly, the socially optimal enforcement
regime may involve a mixture of instruments, as when instruments that are initially efficient
becomes less so the more they are employed. Roughly speaking, however, instruments that
tend to be more efficient across a broad range of employment levels will be more intensely
employed at the optimum. Furthermore, the efficiency of each instrument in the
neighborhood of current levels of employment (which may not be optimal) is relevant for
determining how best to increase deterrence from its current level, should that be desired. It
is also relevant to determining whether and how, in producing the current level of
deterrence, resources could be conserved by substituting one instrument for another.
97 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
96
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underlying the law. Perjury and obstruction of justice are crimes, just
as robbery is a crime.98 Uncharged obstructive behavior in the
investigation or prosecution of another crime is grounds for
sentencing enhancement.99 And various forms of evidentiary foul
play—short of perjury or obstruction, but long of zealous
advocacy—are subject to procedural sanction, either by explicit
procedural rule100 or by courts’ exercise of their “inherent power” to
govern process.101
But detection avoidance is not, in fact, like robbery. It is a species of
violation with special properties, a social problem to which the usual
detect-and-sanction mechanic does not apply. Cleave another
violation with a sanction and you discourage it. Cleave detection
avoidance, and like the Hydra, its back end grows another head.

A. The infinite regress of detection avoidance
The hip-hop artist, Lil’ Kim was recently convicted of lying to the
grand jury investigating her associates’ involvement in a shooting
outside the studios of radio station Hot 97. At her perjury trial she
lied to the trial jury about having lied to the grand jury.102
The investment bank, Morgan Stanley, was recently sued for aiding
and abetting fraud in connection with the demise of the Sunbeam
Corporation.103
Ordered to produce relevant email
104
correspondence, it stonewalled.105 Ordered to produce documents
relevant to the accusation that it was stonewalling, it stonewalled.106
This is what people do.107 They do not simply lie. They lie about
lying. And if you accuse them of that, they lie about lying about
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1001, 1621, 1623, 1503, 1505, 1512, 1519, 1520.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1.
100 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26(g), and 37.
101 See, e.g., Cappellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989) (imposing monetary
sanction for document destruction); Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D.
Fla. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985) (similar); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836
F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988) (issuing spoliation instruction for destruction under document
retention policy).
102 Julia Preston, Admitting to Lies About Shooting, Lil' Kim Gets One Year in Prison, N. Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2005, at B1.
103 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
104 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at __ (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005) (describing “Agreed Order”)
105 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at *5, *5 n. 11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar.
23, 2005).
106 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005). (“MS & Co. improperly failed to produce 125 documents required to be produced by
the Court’s February 3, 2005, Order Specially Setting Hearing which required limited
discovery be made in connection with the February 14, 2005, hearing on the Adverse
Inference Motion.”)
107 See also United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607 (6th Cir 2003) (describing how, in an
attempt to lighten his sentence for bank robbery, the defendant fabricated a letter from the
98
99
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lying. They do not simply destroy evidence. They also destroy
evidence of evidence destruction. And if you ask them about either
destruction, they lie. They do not merely intimidate witnesses. They
lie about the intimidation, and then destroy evidence of the lying, and
then intimidate witnesses to the destruction. By real people, in real
time cover up is covered up in a chain of effectively infinite length: a
chain, that is, always one link longer than the pursuer is willing to
follow it.
This potentially infinite regress wreaks havoc on the conventional
detection-and-sanction machinery of neoclassical enforcement
theory. We have already noted Malik’s insight that imposing a fine
on primary violations like robbery encourages individuals to expend
effort avoiding detection of primary violations. We can generalize
this to the “detection avoidance principle”: sanctioning activity X
encourages another activity X+1 in the form of effort exerted to
avoid detection of X.
Stating the principle in these general terms makes clear that it is
recursive. Because the formula applies to any activity X, we are free
to substitute “detection avoidance” itself for X, whereby it begets an
X+1 equal to effort exerted to avoid detection of detection avoidance.
Indeed, nothing stops us from returning to the formula with
“detection avoidance of detection avoidance,” substituting this for X
and generating, as X+1, effort exerted to avoid detection of detection
avoidance of detection avoidance. And we may continue like this ad
infinitum repeatedly inputting the last application’s output.
Thus, when we punish people more for underlying offenses, we
encourage offenders to lie. If we try to solve this problem by
punishing more for lying we encourage liars to expend more effort
covering up their lies. If we try to solve this problem by increasing
the punishment for covering up lies, we encourage the cover up of the
cover up of lying. Similarly, raising the punishment for the
underlying offense encourages offenders to seek and destroy
damaging evidence. If we attack this social waste by punishing the
destruction of evidence, we encourage people who still destroy
evidence to (inter alia) destroy evidence of their destruction. If we
mother of his children stating that he had consistently made child support payments.
Indicted for the obstructive forgery, he attempted to convince the mother to falsely testify
that she had consented to the letter. Accused of this attempt to suborn perjury, he then lied
about the incident.); U.S. v. Lueddeke 908 F.2d 230 (7th 1990) (describing how the
defendant lied to a grand jury about making illegal payments to college football players to
induce them to sign representation agreements. Informed that he was being investigated for
perjury, he forged documents to cover up the lie.); United States v. Agoro 966 F.2d 1288,
1290 (1st Cir 1993) (describing how the defendant fled the jurisdiction following his
conviction for credit card fraud, and how, charged with failing to appear, he fabricated an
excuse involving his wife’s emergency return to Nigeria on developing a “paralyzing disease
of unknown origin”).
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then take aim at destruction of evidence of evidence destruction, we
encourage people to destroy evidence of their destruction of evidence
of evidence destruction. In more general (but less confusing) terms,
sanctioning the underlying offender encourages “first order”
detection avoidance. Sanctioning first order detection avoidance
encourages “second order” detection avoidance. Sanctioning second
order encourages third. Sanctioning third encourages forth. And so
on.
Is it really plausible that violators engage in higher orders of cover
up? What is cover up of cover up of cover up of cover up? The
assertion here is not that cover up four times (or n times) removed is
unconditionally plausible. The assertion is that it becomes plausible
in the only circumstance that its plausibility matters. This is where it
is assumed that the government can identify, sanction, and thereby
discourage cover up three times removed. The effectiveness of that
sanction presupposes that cover up thrice removed is a discernible
activity in the minds of violators. And at that point, its progeny is
irrelevant: it is just an activity and it will be covered up like any other
that is also subject to sanction. All that matters is that cover-up four
times removed is the child of a now sanctioned activity. That the
now sanctioned activity also has a parent (who in turn has a parent,
etc…) is of no consequence.
The point, therefore, is not that the detection avoidance principle
unfolds in infinite regress all by itself. The point is that it will unfold
if prodded: that it always remains one order ahead of the last effective
sanction.

B. Clarifying remarks
Of course, the existence of an additional unanticipated difficulty is
not by itself reason to give up on the enterprise of sanctioning
detection avoidance. And the next Part of the article explores what
might be done to surmount this newfound issue. But first a few
clarifying remarks regarding the nature of the problem to be
addressed.
First, sanctioning any given order of detection avoidance does, to be
sure, reduce spending on that order, just as sanctioning robbery (“0th
order detection avoidance”) reduces robbery. The point is that while
that order of detection avoidance is discouraged, higher orders are
encouraged. Summing across all orders of detection avoidance, X =
1, 2, 3,… the net effect is as likely an increase as a decrease in the
total social waste of detection avoidance activities across all orders.
The effect on that total is what is of ultimate concern. In general
whether aggregate detection avoidance increases or decreases will
depend on the “sanctioning hierarchy:” in particular, whether
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sanctions are constant, increasing, or decreasing across orders of
avoidance, as discussed in the next Part.
Second, the claim here is not that sanctioning lower order detection
avoidance necessarily produces higher order detection avoidance
where there was none before. The offender’s ability to avoid
detection of her detection avoidance determines in part her success in
avoiding detection. Success in avoiding detection by destroying
documents, for example, is fostered by destroying documentary
evidence of the destruction. The claim, rather, is that sanctioning
detection avoidance additionally encourages higher order detection
avoidance where there was no such additional encouragement. 108
Thirdly, despite first appearances, the recursivity of detection
avoidance is not another example of the age-old policy pitfall of
ignoring substitution effects. The policy “hall of shame” is full of
such instances: as when trying to reduce the fishing harvest by
limiting boat size, we just induce fishermen to use better equipment
with little effect on harvest;109 or trying to enhance teacher
performance by rewarding for high student test scores, we quash the
teaching of unobservable attributes like creativity;110 or trying to
prevent car theft by equipping some cars with visible steering locks,
we just induce thieves to rob the cars lacking such locks; 111 or trying
to reduce cocaine use by increasing the penalty, we end up
encouraging the use of heroin.112 In all these cases, one activity is
effectively “taxed” (“subsidized”), and the corresponding reduction
(increase) in that activity makes an alternative activity more (less)
productive. This seesaw relationship between one activity’s level and
the other’s productivity is the essence of the substitution effect.
If anything, however, higher and lower orders of detection avoidance
are “complements,” not substitutes. More of either increases the
productivity of the other. More cover up of the cover up, that is,

This implies a more complex and complete version of the detection avoidance principle.
Sanctioning detection avoidance of order X encourages all orders of detection avoidance
greater than X, since all higher order facilitate avoiding detection of X. This is the version
of the principle explored in the appendix.
109 See, e.g., James N. Sanchirico, Managing Marine Capture Fisheries with Incentive Based Price
Instruments, 3 PUB. FIN & MGMT 67, 67-69 (2003) (“[A] suite of regulations, including gear
and vessel restrictions, minimum size limits, total allowable catch limits, closed areas and
seasons…increase the costs of fishing, but in a manner that distorts the optimal allocation of
resources.”)
110 Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Multitask principal agent analysis: incentive contracts, assets
ownership and job design, 7 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 24, 25 (1991).
111 C. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J. URBAN ECON. 388 (1978); Steven
Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991); Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt Measuring Positive Externalities from
Unobservable Victim Precautions: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q. J. ECON. 43 (1998)).
112 Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997) [hereinafter
Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty].
108
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makes the cover up itself more productive, not less. Conversely, more
cover up makes covering up the cover up more productive. The
detection avoidance principle does not describe a situation in which
we “tax” lower order detection avoidance and thereby cause a
substitution into higher. Taxing lower order detection avoidance—
and nothing else—ought to reduce complementary higher order
detection avoidance. What’s happening rather is that the “tax” on
lower order detection avoidance is simultaneously a “subsidy” on
higher. An additional dollar of sanction on first order avoidance, for
example, is in effect an additional dollar of reward for second.113

VI. Sanctioning hierarchies
Deterring detection avoidance is, as argued in the preceding Part, not
merely a matter of hammering it down with sanctions in the
conventional manner. Rather the enterprise is a bit more like the
carnival game with moles, holes, and mallets. Clobber first order
avoidance with a sanction and this causes second order avoidance to
pop its head out of some other hole. Knock second back down and
third pops up somewhere else. Wallop third and up comes fourth.
A few minutes of this and one understandably develops the
conviction that what is really needed is a mallet with an infinite
number heads to hammer all holes at once. In this Part we consider
just this: simultaneously sanctioning all “orders” of detection
avoidance (as well as the underlying violation).

A. Uniform sanctions
We begin with policies that apply the same level of sanction to all
orders of avoidance. For its relative simplicity, this most basic of
sanctioning hierarchies is a good place to start analytically. It is also a
good starting point doctrinally: criminal statutes applicable to certain
egregious forms of detection avoidance read as if they do just this, at
least for order one through infinity. All orders of perjury—including
perjury about perjury about perjury about perjury—are potentially
perjury and are thus sanctioned, at least in theory, to the same degree.
The same holds for all orders of obstruction of justice.
Whether we truly do, or even could impose a universal sanction on
all orders of detection avoidance is open to serious question, as
discussed later in this Part. But it is important to recognize that even
were a universal sanction practicable, it would have contradictory
Another important issue for analysis not considered in this article is substitution across
modes (rather than orders) of detection avoidance. Sanctioning one mode of avoidance and
not a second will generally cause substitution into the second. This may be partly beneficial
if the first mode has substantial external costs or is otherwise less desirable socially.
113
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effects, simultaneously discouraging and encouraging detection
avoidance. Indeed, to the extent that offenders balance the marginal
costs and benefits of detection avoidance in deciding how much to
engage in the activity, the net effect of a universal sanction would be
to positively encourage detection avoidance.
In the explanation that follows we focus on the effect on second
order detection avoidance of increasing a universal detection
avoidance sanction. The analysis applies to any order of detection
avoidance (including first if the primary activity sanction is the same
as the sanction for first order detection avoidance.)

1. Countervailing effects
Second order detection avoidance has, for the perpetrator, both a
sanctions-increasing downside and a sanctions-reducing upside. The
sanctions-increasing downside results from the increased possibility
of incurring a sanction for second order detection avoidance activity
itself. The more the offender engages in such activity, the greater the
prevalence of evidentiary emissions therefrom, and, therefore, the
greater her chance of getting caught. Of course, the magnitude of
this downside depends also on the size of the sanction that is invited.
The sanctions-reducing upside of second order detection avoidance is
borne from the decreased possibility of incurring the sanction for first
order detection avoidance. It is correspondingly dependent on the
size of the sanction that is avoided.
Increasing the universal sanction for detection avoidance increases
both the sanction-increasing downside and the sanctions-reducing
upside of second order detection avoidance. It makes second order
detection avoidance both more dangerous and more imperative.
Consider, for instance, the following stylized example that we shall
carry throughout the next several sections. Imagine that we increase
the uniform fine from $400,000 to $1,000,000. We then also increase
the benefit to the perpetrator of every percentage point decrease in
the chance of having to pay this fine for her first order detection
avoidance. For a risk neutral perpetrator, for example, that value was
formerly 1% of $400,000, or $4,000. Now it is 1% of $1,000,000, or
$10,000.
Conversely, we also increase the cost to the perpetrator of every
percentage point increase in the chance of having to pay this fine for
her second order detection avoidance itself: again from $4,000 to
$10,000. Additional second order detection avoidance is, therefore,
$6,000 more beneficial to the offender for every percentage point that it
reduces the probability of detection for first order detection
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avoidance, and it is $6,000 more costly for every percentage point
that it increases the probability of detection of itself.
In general, raising the universal sanction will increase the per percentage
point upside of additional detection avoidance as much as it decreases
the per percentage point downside.

2. Sanctions’ dominant effect on the upside
Whether increasing the universal sanction increases the upside of
additional second order detection avoidance more than the downside
depends, therefore, on whether additional second order avoidance
decreases the chance of sanction for first order avoidance by more
percentage points than it increases the chance of sanction for second.
Returning to the numerical example, suppose, for instance, that
$1000 of additional detection avoidance decreases the probability of
sanction for first order detection avoidance by two percentage points
while increasing the probability of sanction for second order
detection avoidance by only one. We have already determined that
increasing the universal sanction from $400,000 to $1,000,000
increases both the upside and downside of second order detection
avoidance by $6000 per percentage point. Therefore, the upside of
detection avoidance increases by $12,000 and the downside by only
$6,000. On net, therefore, the increase in the universal sanction
encourages additional detection avoidance.
What’s happening here is that the net probability change from
additional second order detection avoidance spending tilts in favor of
second order detection avoidance. Increasing the uniform sanction
amplifies the benefits of this favorable net change in probabilities and
so encourages additional detection avoidance.
Indeed, this is liable to be the general case. To see this, consider the
violator’s choice of second order detection avoidance prior to the
increase in the uniform sanction. Focus, in particular, on the last
$1000 that she chose to spend on detection avoidance. This $1000
must have purchased something beneficial for the violator, otherwise
she would not have spent it. What it purchased was a reduction in
the chance of having to pay the uniform sanction for second order
detection avoidance that was affirmatively greater than the increase in
the chance of having to pay that same sanction for first. The same is
liable to be true for the next $1000. In this case, additional spending
on second order detection avoidance will indeed effect a net
reduction in the chance of having to pay the uniform sanction, a net
reduction that becomes more valuable when the sanction that is on
net avoided is increased.
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B. Increasing sanctions
If a uniform sanction fails to discourage detection avoidance, is there
a non uniform sanction structure that does the job? On a purely
theoretical level, the answer is yes. The sanction hierarchy needs to
be such that higher orders of detection avoidance are punished more
severely. Unfortunately this purely theoretical level barely intersects
the practical plane.
When we raised the uniform sanction in the previous section, the per
probability point changes in second order avoidance’s upside and
downside were equal. Thus, the fact that the upside reduction in
probability points exceeded the downside increase ruled the day. The
way to fix this is to make the per probability point change greater for
the downside than for the upside. And the way to do this is to raise
the second order sanction more than the first.
The simplest case is where we increase only the second order
sanction. This has no (direct) effect on the sanctions-reducing upside
of second order detection avoidance. On the other hand, it increases
the sanctions-increasing downside. Therefore, it discourages second
order detection avoidance and appears to solve the problem
identified in the previous Part.
But this avenue of approach quickly runs into several debilitating
problems. The first is practical. Imposing different sanctions across
first and second order detection avoidance activities supposes that
the state can reliably distinguish between them. This is likely to be
difficult. Especially so, given that we have thus provided the second
order perpetrator—caught for some detection avoidance—with an
interest in portraying her avoidance activity as merely first order in an
effort to reduce her sanction.
The second problem begins as theoretical and ends as a
multiplication of the practical problem just described. When we
further increase the sanction for second order detection avoidance
we also further increase the sanctions-reducing benefit of third order
detection avoidance. Again, the recursivity of the detection
avoidance principle casts its shadow on an otherwise hopeful
proposal.
In order to address this additional leakage, we would have to increase
the sanction for third order detection avoidance even more than the
sanction for second. If we kept the first order sanction at $400,000
and raised the second order to $1,000,000, for instance, we might
have to raise the third order sanction to $1,600,000. That, of course,
will then encourage fourth order detection avoidance, and the sanction
for it will have to be raised by an even greater amount, perhaps from
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$400,000 to $2,000,000. In principle, this would proceed ad infinitum,
producing an ever increasing schedule of sanctions.
The necessity of ever increasing fines compounds the practical
problems discussed above. Telling second order detection avoidance
from first is hard enough. Telling fifth order from, say, third is likely
to be nearly impossible. Indeed, telling fifth order detection
avoidance from activities that are not detection avoidance of any
order seems itself a nearly insurmountable difficulty.

C. Decreasing sanctions
The fact that higher orders of detection avoidance are likely to get
lost in the crowd of daily activity leads to the very real possibility that
not only is an increasing sanction impracticable, but, in fact the best
we can do is even worse than the uniform sanction considered in the
first section of this Part. The best we can do, it would seem, is a
sanctioning hierarchy that is, in effect, if not on paper, decreasing in
the order of detection avoidance, with first order avoidance
sanctioned most severely, second order less severely, third order even
less severely, and so on.
To some extent, this is even reflected in current law. It is true, as
noted above, that criminal statutes dealing with perjury and
obstruction do not make a distinction between first and higher order
instances of their respective crimes. In practice, however, higher
order instances of detection avoidance are more likely to be punished
not by separate charge and conviction, but by a sentencing
enhancement for the first order obstruction.114 These sentencing
enhancements do make a distinction, generally imposing a lower
punishment on higher order avoidance. Thus, the advisory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing enhancement for
obstructive activity that is itself aimed at the investigation,
prosecution, and sentencing of obstruction of justice. But the
enhancement is two offense levels, while the base offense level for
obstruction is fourteen.115 For the case in which the defendant has
no criminal history and sentences fall at the midpoint of their
respective guideline ranges, this means that second order obstruction

There appear to be no reported cases in which the defendant is charged with perjury or
obstruction, and where the underlying proceeding was itself a prosecution for perjury or
obstruction. There are, however, several reported cases in which a sentence for obstruction
of justice was enhanced for further obstructive behavior. See supra note 107. See also infra
note 115.
115 Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 with id. § 3C1.1. This is true
even if the second order obstruction results in separate conviction. Id. § 3C1.1. Application
Note 8. See also id. § 2J1.3, Application Note 2.
114
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offers you the chance to avoid 18 months in jail at the risk of
increasing your sentence by 6 months.116
Arguably, yet higher orders of detection avoidance are punished even
less. Although second order detection avoidance is specifically
treated in the sentencing guidelines, orders higher than second are
not. By the most plausible reading, however, the enhancement is not
two levels per unit of higher order obstructive behavior, but two levels
per existence of any amount of higher order obstruction.
Furthermore, it is arguably the case that nth order detection avoidance
cannot generally be detected unless n-1th order is as well—that the
state cannot determine that someone is lying about having lied
without first determining that she lied. In that case, there is in effect
no additional sanction in the guidelines for third, fourth, or higher
orders of detection avoidance. Indeed, while there are many reported
cases in which a sentence for obstruction was enhanced for
secondary obstruction,117 there appear to be no reported cases
additionally enhancing a sentence for third or higher order
obstruction.
To the extent that the guidelines still guide, therefore, the federal
system punishes first order obstruction by 18 months in prison,
second order by 6, and third, fourth fifth, etc.. by zero. And it is
interesting to note that this downward slope has recently been
steepened as between first and higher orders of detection avoidance
by those provisions in Sarbanes Oxley118 that resulted in an increase
in the offense level for obstruction from 12 to 14 without also
increasing the enhancement for second order obstruction, nor
affecting at all the effective sanction for orders higher than two.
Staying with the case of midpoint sentencing and no criminal history
this translated into an increase of five months in the sentence for first
order obstruction with no appreciable increase in the sentences for
higher orders.119
Another example of the proposition that the sanctioning hierarchy
slopes downward in practice is the state criminal prosecution of Lil’

Indeed, no matter what the criminal history and no matter where in each guideline range
the judge chooses, the increase in prison time for second order obstruction is always less
than the prison time for first. One can see this by noting that the lower bound sentence for
offense level 14 exceeds, for all criminal history categories, the difference between the upper
bound for offense level 16 and the lower bound for offense level 14. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A Sentencing Table.
117 See supra note 107.
118 See supra note 12 and surrounding text.
119 In fact, the midpoint sentence for second order obstruction actually decreases by one
month. The midpoint sentences for no criminal history are 13 months for offense level 12,
18 months for offense level 14 and 24 months for offense level 16. Thus an increase of two
offense levels from 12 to 14 is 5 months, while the increase of two levels from 14 to 16 is 6.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A Sentencing Table.
116
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Kim, referred to above, who lied to a New York state trial jury about
having lied to the grand jury. Lil’ Kim has never been indicted for
her false statements at trial. At sentencing for perjuring herself
before the grand jury, though, the prosecutor requested a tougher
sentence of two years and nine months on the basis of Lil’ Kim’s
second order lying at trial. In the end, however, making explicit
reference to Martha Stewart’s ten month sentence (an implicitly,
Martha Stewart’s similar behavior), the judge sentenced Lil’ Kim to
only a year and a day.120
Therefore, the sanctions structure that we can and actually do impose
in the general case, appears to be the opposite of what we would
want to do theoretically. When the sanction for second order
detection avoidance is lower than the sanction for first, we are
effectively magnifying the sanctions-reducing upside of second order
detection avoidance while dampening the sanctions-increasing
downside. The same applies to detection avoidance of higher orders.

VII. Piggyback
sanctions:
spoliation
instructions, investigative policies, etc…
Sentences for perjury and obstruction are meted out in terms of
monetary fines and imprisonment. But these are not the only
currencies of punishment, nor are they the only ones actually
employed. Several legal doctrines effectively punish detected
detection avoidance by increasing the chance of detection for the
underlying violation.
Consider again the case in which, sued for aiding and abetting fraud,
Morgan Stanley stonewalled in discovery. The court initially
sanctioned Morgan by shifting the burden of proof. Ordinarily, the
plaintiff would have had to prove with a preponderance of the
evidence that Morgan did indeed aid and abet fraud. Following the
court’s initial ruling, Morgan had to prove that it did not. The court
also specified in its initial ruling that a “statement of evidence” was to
be read to the jury explaining that Morgan’s stonewalling was relevant
to its consciousness of guilt and to the appropriateness of punitive
damages.121 When Morgan’s bad behavior continued after this initial
ruling, the court amended its order adding a more severe penalty of
similar form: essentially that the jury was to take as given that Morgan

120 Julia Preston, Admitting to Lies About Shooting, Lil' Kim Gets One Year in Prison” N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 7, 2005 at B1.
121 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005) (describing Adverse Inference Order). It is not clear from this opinion precisely
which burden(s) were shifted—production, persuasion or both.
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had aided and abetted the fraud, leaving only the issue whether the
plaintiff was in fact influenced and harmed thereby.122
All three of the sanctions in the Morgan case—shifting the burden of
proof, adversely instructing the jury, and taking adverse facts as
given—act in a similar way. They do not impose separate sanctions
on detection avoidance as do the crimes of perjury and obstruction.
Rather they sanction the detection avoidance by effectively increasing
the probability of sanction for the conduct whose detection is being avoided.
A nudging instruction suggesting an adverse inference from the
defendant’s “spoliation”123 increases the chance that liability is
imposed to the extent that the jury is impressionable, sensitive to the
cue, or simply would not have thought of the evidence in the manner
suggested. Certainly, taking adverse facts as given increases the
chance that those facts will be taken as true. And shifting the burden
of proof onto the defendant means that all those cases wherein
neither party would be able to meet the burden are now cases where
the defendant rather than the plaintiff loses.
A sanction of similar effect is meted out by investigators and
prosecutors, rather than judges, and is the byproduct of directing
investigative resources for underlying violations toward cases that
show evidence of obstruction. The SEC, for example, might
explicitly announce a kind of counterpunch strategy: should it come
across evidence of obstructive behavior in the course of investigating
insider trading, for instance, it would respond by stepping up the
investigation of the insider trading. There is some evidence that the SEC
and other regulatory bodies do follow such a policy.124

Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at *9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005).
123 “Spoliation is a broad term including the destruction, suppression, or concealment of
tangible evidence as well as flight from the scene of the crime or from the jurisdiction.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5178, 5181 n1 (2005). Spoliation is sometimes referred to as
“badges of fraud” or “badges of guilt.” See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Concealment and Novel Fraud
(Aug. 24. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (advocating use of “badges
of guilt” to determine consciousness of “wrongdoing” to, in turn, determine guilt in white
collar crime cases where novel behavior is not clearly fraudulent under existing law).
124 Carberry & Gordon, supra note 36, at 1 (“Securities crimes that include evidence of
obstruction are …more likely to be prosecuted because of the importance to protect the
system…. [A]s in the perjury and obstruction cases, the falsification of records or filings will
be a factor weighing heavily toward prosecution, even if the conduct being covered up,
standing alone, would not be prosecuted.) See also Memorandum from Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson to United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecutions
of
Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2004)
(“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor [in deciding whether and how to
prosecute] is whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in
conduct that impedes the investigation [whether or not rising to the level of criminal
obstruction]. Examples of such conduct include: overly broad assertions of corporate
representation of employees or former employees; inappropriate directions to employees or
122
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The seemingly compelling notion behind this kind of obstructiontargeting of investigative resources is that it renders obstruction
ineffectual. Obstructive behavior designed to foul a given level of
detection effort by the regulator—to the extent that it is itself
detected—simultaneously increases the regulator’s level of detection
effort. The intended effect is presumably to neutralize the impact of
obstructive behavior on the probability of detection for insider
trading.
This policy is similar in effect to burden shifting, nudging
instructions, and taking facts as given. The regulator’s counterresponsive increase in detection effort acts as a sanction on
obstructive behavior. And here again, the sanction is an increase in
the probability of detection for the underlying wrong, thus riding on
the back of the lower order sanction.
In evaluating all such piggyback sanctions, the first thing to note is
that, despite their initial appeal, they are subject to the same basic
issue as sanctioning detection avoidance straight up. They too suffer
from detection avoidance’s recursive nature.
These policies
condition a negative consequence for the detection avoider upon
detection of her detection avoidance. Thus, while they do discourage
detection avoidance in the first instance, they also encourage the
detection avoider to avoid detection of her detection avoidance.
Now, in contrast to perjury and obstruction, the negative
consequence for the perpetrator is not a separate, higher order
sanction, but rather an increased chance of being sanctioned for the
lower order wrong. But, for the proposition that recursion is still a
problem, the distinction is irrelevant. All that matters is that the
consequence is negative and that it is conditioned on detection of the
detection avoidance.
In fact, the second thing to note is that piggyback sanctions not only
fail to avoid the recursion problem, they exacerbate it. This is
because they amount to imposing a sanctioning hierarchy that

their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the investigation
including, for example, the direction to decline to be interviewed; making presentations or
submissions that contain misleading assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed
production of records; and failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the
corporation.”); Sandra Rubin, Whose Lawyer Are You Now?, available at
http://www.zsa.ca/En/Articles/article.php?aid=1077 (last visited July, 26 2005) (reporting
on statements of Stephen Cutler, then SEC director of enforcement, to a Practicing Law
Institute panel: “many in the defense bar believe has led the SEC to become more aggressive
in requesting waivers of attorney-client privilege and in using the stick of higher penalties for
non-co-operation against corporations it is investigation…Mr. Cutler got some hear from
fellow panelists who made it clear they view the increasingly regular demands of SEC staff
and U.S. Justice Department official with frustration and alarm. They said frequent requests
for waiver of privilege and the expectation that internal information will be shared, coupled
with the high cost of non-co-operation, are eroding lawyers’ ability to do their jobs.”)
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decreases in the order of detection avoidance. As we saw in the
previous Part, a decreasing sanctions hierarchy encourages detection
avoidance. We saw there, in particular, that when the sanction for
first order detection avoidance is greater than the sanction for second
order detection avoidance, then the sanction that second order
avoidance avoids is greater than the sanction that it invites.
Accordingly, second order detection avoidance is encouraged on net.
Applied as well to the special case of second order detection
avoidance, piggyback sanctions work as follows. If the individual is
caught for first order detection avoidance (the underlying wrong with
respect to second order detection avoidance), she incurs the sanction
therefor. If the individual is caught for second order detection
avoidance, her effective sanction is an increase in the likelihood that
she will incur the sanction for first order detection avoidance. The
point is that the latter sanction is always smaller. Punishing someone
by definitely sanctioning them (in the event of detection) is more
severe than punishing them by increasing the chance that they will have
to pay that same sanction.
For example, suppose that the sanction for first order detection
avoidance is $500,000 and suppose that the punishment for second
order detection avoidance is that it increases the chance of having to
pay this $500,000 sanction from 50% to 90%. Then the effective
sanction for second order detection avoidance is 40 percentage
points of $500,000, or $200,000, which is, of course, less than
$500,000.
The same analysis applies to first, rather than second order detection
avoidance, a more familiar context for piggyback sanctions. For
every percentage point that destroying documents reduces the chance
of liability, the defendant saves one percent of the damages that
would be imposed. For every percentage point that the document
destruction increases the chance of having to suffer an adverse jury
instruction, the defendant incurs one percent of the value of some
instruction-induced increase in the chance of having to pay the same
damages. The effect of such an implicitly decreasing sanctioning
structure, taken as a whole, is to induce detection avoidance, not
deter it.

VIII. The technological approach and its quiet
prevalence
All of these problematic approaches to detection avoidance have in
common that they condition negative consequences—whether
separate sanctions or piggyback sanctions—on the detection of
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detection avoidance, thereby encouraging higher order avoidance just
as they discourage lower.
But sanctioning an activity is not the only approach to discouraging
it. Against her private benefits from the violation the potential
violator weighs, in fact, two sorts of costs; not just the expected cost
of sanctions, but also the “direct cost” of realizing the activity’s
private benefits. In lieu of imposing legally constructed costs on an
activity, therefore, the law can potentially discourage an activity by
increasing its direct cost.
In the special case of detection avoidance, this direct approach
attacks the “technology” by which offenders convert their time,
effort and expenditure into reductions in the probability of detection.
The point of attack is the design of evidentiary process, inclusive of
investigative techniques and policies.
To be sure, decreasing the technological productivity of law
violations is a time-honored strategy in public—and private—
enforcement. Steel vaults increase the cost of bank robbery. Steering
wheel locks increase the cost of car theft. Airport security increases
the cost of hijacking.125 The claim here is not to have invented the
technological approach. Rather, the claim is two-fold.
First, the technological approach to detection avoidance avoids the
recursivity problem that specially plagues attempts to sanction such
activities. The technological approach therefore has an advantage
over sanctioning in the case of detection avoidance that is not also
present in the case of underlying violations like bank robbery, car
theft, and hijacking.
Second, as this first factor may help to justify and explain,126 the law
does in fact rely more on the direct approach and less on sanctions—
For recent manifestations of this idea see Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, supra note 112, at
2439-2441 (proposing methods to increase the cost of dealing drugs); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Architecture as Crime Control, 11 YALE L J. 1039, 1043 [hereinafter Katyal, Architecture] (arguing
that “increasing an area’s natural surveillance (its visibility and susceptibility to monitoring by
private citizens), introducing territoriality (by demarcating private and semiprivate spaces),
reducing social isolation, and protecting potential targets” can deter crime by increasing the
cost of perpetration); and Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1003, 1012-1013 (2001) [hereinafter Katyal, Cyberspace] (examining strategies to increase the
technological cost of computer crimes: “first-party strategies (preventing offenders from
committing acts by raising perpetration costs and legal risks), second-party strategies
(encouraging victims to protect against attacks, thereby making it more expensive for
criminals to commit crimes and easier for them to get caught), and third-party strategies
(relying on ISPs and other entities to monitor risky activity and forestall attacks through
architectural solutions.”).
126 Another reason that the technological approach is especially suited to detection avoidance
is that the technology of detection avoidance is relatively pliable. The technology of
detection avoidance is intimately determined by the state itself in the manner in which its
designs adjudication. The levers of state influence are thus more solidly attached and more
125
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in practice, if not on paper—with regard to detection avoidance as
compared to primary activity violations.
The current Part takes up the second of these claims. Part IX
explains the mechanics of the technological approach. And Part X
explains what practical steps the law can and does take to dampen the
productivity of detection avoidance.

Indictments and convictions for perjury and obstruction are
sensational events and so more likely than most aspects of evidentiary
procedure to appear on the front pages of newspapers (not to
mention the introductory pages of law review articles). But an
investigation of evidentiary procedural law that runs deeper and
broader than a survey of headlines indicates that, in fact, perjury,
obstruction, and sanctioning in general is not the bread and butter of
the law’s approach to detection avoidance. In fact, the law quietly
disfavors the sanctioning approach, opting instead for a direct
technological attack on the productivity of detection avoidance
spending.
Consider, first, that much detection avoidance is not criminal, nor
even subject to procedural sanction. Grossly misleading, yet
technically true statements are generally not perjurious, for
example.127 Similarly, document destruction, witness coercion and
other forms of obstructive behavior are usually not criminal unless
they are targeted toward a specific official proceeding or
investigation. In some cases that proceeding or investigation must
have already commenced.128 In most cases, it must at least be
specifically anticipated.129

deeply seated for detection avoidance than for most other regulated activities. Cf., Katyal,
Cyberspace, supra note 125, at 1012-1013 (examining strategies to increase the technological
cost of computer crimes and pointing to the artificiality of internet architecture as a source
of malleability); Katyal, Architecture, supra note 125, at 1043 (suggesting that realspace
architecture can also be designed to decrease the productivity of realspace criminal activity).
127 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) (holding that a statement must be literally
false to be perjurious under 18 U.S.C. § 1621); United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d
684, 689 (1st Cir. 1988) (extending holding in Bronston to 18 U.S.C. § 1623).
128 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995); Oesterle, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 1201-02 (“[S]ection 1503 apparently allows parties to destroy any
documents, even those relevant to future civil actions, if the destruction occurs before the
complaint is filed.” (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1503)).
129 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, ___ (2005) (interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) “A ’knowingly ... corrup[t] persaude[r]’ cannot be someone who
persuades others to shred documents under a document retention policy when he does not
have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those documents might be
material.”)
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A similar pattern characterizes procedural, as opposed to criminal
sanctions. Only egregious stonewalling in discovery is sanctionable;
Morgan Stanley’s recent comeuppance, as described above, is
atypical.130 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which, inter alia,
sanctions civil defendants who deny in their answers factual
assertions that they know to be true, is generally regarded as
“toothless.”131 And evidence destruction in the context of a ongoing
“document retention policy” is neither criminally obstructive, nor
grounds for burden shifting, nor even grounds for issuance of an
instruction alerting the jury to inferences it might draw from a party’s
failure to produce.132
Second, what evidence there is suggests that even when detection
avoidance rises to a sanctionable level, sanctions are rarely imposed.
The view that sanctionable detection avoidance is rampant and that
the law most often looks the other way is surprisingly ubiquitous
among scholars, attorneys, and judges.133 (There have even been
attempts to support this view with systematic empirical evidence134—
though a close examination of these findings casts serious doubt on
their relevance, despite their frequent citation.135)
What explains the law’s apparent indifference toward sanctioning
procedural crimes and violations? Judge Posner and others ascribe
the attitude to the generally held view “that the court system has been
designed, or at least has evolved, to be robust in the face of the
known inefficacy of the oath and of the threat of prosecution for
perjury [and obstruction]… and as result, of the frequency of these

See Oesterle, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1188 (arguing that "existing
laws on the consequences of document destruction are too lenient"). But see Nesson, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 806 (1991) (“Existing rules are more than
adequate.”).
131 Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States Transmitting Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072, reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 507, 507 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Thomas, J.).
132 Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, ___ (2005) (“It is, of course, not
wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document retention
policy under ordinary circumstances.”). Cf., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, ___
(8th Cir. 1988) (requiring for purposes of providing a spoliation instruction under the
court’s inherent powers that a document retention policies be, inter alia, “reasonable”). But
see Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, Part II.B.2.c at 1275-1279 (questioning the relevance of
Lewy despite its frequent citation in the scholarly literature.
133 See, e.g., Harris, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1771-72 (1996); Nesson,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 806-07 (1991) (“[I]n practice, judges are
extremely reluctant either to expose discovery violations or to punish discovery violations
once exposed, applying the rules instead in ways that minimize or avoid the problem.”);
POSNER, supra note 50, at 147 (1999). See also Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., Part I.A. at 1230 (describing this general agreement).
134 See supra note 52.
135 Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1231-1245
(2004) (critiquing these studies and their use in legal scholarship).
130
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crimes…”136 Such robustness implicates deep structural features of
evidentiary procedure that reduce the technological productivity of
detection avoidance, features that are ubiquitous in the design and
daily practice of legal process, as detailed in Part X.

IX. Mechanics of the technological approach
Before examining what the law can and does do to reduce the
productivity of detection avoidance, it is worth clarifying what such
productivity reductions accomplish and why they are likely to be
superior to sanctioning.

A. Effect on detection avoidance
Reducing the returns from an investment reduces the amount that
individuals invest therein. In the same way, reducing the return from
detection avoidance reduces the resources that detection avoiders
devote to avoiding detection.
In more detail, imagine that an offender, having violated the law, is
now deciding whether or not to spend some fixed amount of money,
say $100,000 on detection avoidance.137 Whether this makes sense
for her depends on what she gets in return for that expense. This, in
turn, depends on several factors. If, to clarify the presentation, we
imagine that detection avoidance is itself not separately sanctioned,
then two factors predominate.
The first factor is the magnitude of the sanction that will be imposed
upon detection. The second factor is the “productivity” of the
detection avoidance spending: the amount by which the $100,000
expense reduces the probability that the underlying violation will be
detected. Increasing either the sanction or the productivity of

136 POSNER, supra note 50, at 147. See also Harris, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 1771-72 (1996) (“Increasingly, the attitude of judges and lawyers toward perjury is one of
acceptance and tolerance. They have resigned themselves to the fact that perjury is an
inevitable outcome of an adversarial system of justice which the legal system may just have
to tolerate. Furthermore, prosecutors do not believe that it is a serious problem they need to
be concerned with. They point out that it is the jury's job as the factfinder to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence and ascertain the truth. By the end of a trial,
unreliable testimony and evidence have been rejected, truthful testimony and evidence
considered, and an outcome determined. Because most prosecutors believe that the problem
of perjury has been resolved by the conclusion of the trial, they argue that it is a waste of
valuable resources to then pursue perjury charges arising out of that proceeding, rather than
committing those resources to investigating and prosecuting more important crimes that are
overloading the court’s docket.”).
137 The appendix considers the more general case wherein the offender may spend any
amount on detection avoidance. In this broader context, the technological attack operates
by reducing, at all points, the marginal productivity of detection avoidance spending, defined
loosely to be the change in the probability of detection per additional dollar spent on
detection avoidance.
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detection avoidance increases the return from the $100,000 detection
avoidance expenditure. The larger the sanction, the more valuable
each percentage point reduction in the detection probability. The
greater the percentage point reduction, the more units of this per
point value procured.
Conversely, therefore, reducing the productivity of detection avoidance
is one way to discourage the violator from spending the $100,000. If,
for example, the sanction is fixed at $1,000,000, then the (risk
neutral) violator values each percentage point reduction in the
probability of sanction as the equivalent of a certain gain of $10,000.
She will then spend the $100,000 on detection avoidance only if
doing so reduces the probability of detection by at least ten
percentage points. The object of the technological approach—as
manifest in this simple example—is to conspicuously bring the
productivity of detection avoidance down below ten percentage
points, so that the offender decides not to spend the $100,000.138

1. Bounded rationality
Do people really behave like this? Perhaps the violator has it in her
mind that she is going to spend $100,000 on detection avoidance
irrespective of its productivity. Or perhaps she is dedicated to
reducing the probability of detection by ten percentage points
Three technical notes are in order. First, if only some orders of detection avoidance are
affected in the first instance by the direct attack, will this induce a compensating increase in
expenditure on other orders? Not likely. As noted in Part V.B, orders of detection
avoidance activity are, if anything, complements, not substitutes. This means that reducing
the productivity of some orders of detection avoidance and not others reduces spending on
all orders of detection avoidance. Lower effort expended on orders whose productivity has
been directly reduced by policy are likely to indirectly lower the productivity, and the
expenditure on excluded orders as well. The sanctioning approach also benefits from this
complementarity Unlike the technological approach, however, it steps on this benefit by
simultaneously and directly encouraging higher orders of detection avoidance.
Second, what about the “income effect”? When we increase the price of applies the
consumer may respond by consuming more apples if the income effect is positive and
dominant. Isn’t it then possible that the offender will respond by decreasing or increasing
detection avoidance spending when its productivity declines? But the analogy is actually
inapt. A better analogy is between lowering the productivity of detection avoidance and
lowering the marginal utility of apples. When we lower the marginal utility of applies, there
is no income effect and the consumer consumes fewer apples (assuming that doing so does
not substantially lower the marginal utility of other goods).
Third, more of caveat than an objection, is the fact that decreasing the marginal
productivity of detection avoidance spending is not equivalent to increasing the marginal
cost of detection probability reductions. For example, the rightward horizontal translation
of a probability curve p ( a ) that decreases in detection avoidance expenditure at a
decreasing rate keeps the slope constant at each probability p (and so keeps the marginal cost
constant) but increases the slope at each level a of detection avoidance spending (and so
increases the marginal productivity). As shown in the appendix, a marginal productivity
reduction implies, but is not implied by an increase in marginal cost for this kind of curve.
This is important because merely increasing the marginal cost of probability reductions will
cause the violator to “buy” fewer units of reduction, but each unit will cost more and the
result may not be a decrease in detection avoidance spending.
138
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whatever the cost, in which case the less productive her spending, the
more she will spend to accomplish her goal.
Such boundedly rational decision making may indeed affect the
efficacy of the technological attack. But ultimately the analysis here is
comparative. And so one must recognize that departures from
rationality affect the efficacy of sanctioning detection avoidance as
well. If violators do not respond to productivity decreases, why
should they respond to sanctions? Indeed, we are free to think of a
sanction on detection avoidance as reducing that activity’s
“productivity.” We need only subtract the additional cost of
sanctions above, rather than below the line defining that concept.
Precisely when we do the subtraction is a purely analytic choice and is
unlikely to be a source of real difference in behavior.139

B. Effect on deterrence of underlying violations
The technological approach not only discourages detection
avoidance, it also enhances deterrence of the underlying violation. A
legal sanction has less deterrent force if there is an easy way around it.
Conversely, blocking that dodge—or at least increasing its cost—
increases the sanction’s impact.
Suppose, for example, that $11,000 of detection avoidance decreased
the probability of detection by ten percentage points. Given a
sanction $1,000,000, such an expenditure would be worthwhile. And
in making it the offender would be effectively substituting a $11,000
payment (in terms of detection avoidance spending) for a $100,000
payment (in terms of reduction in expected sanction). This favorable
substitution would lower the all-in cost of the underlying violation by
$89,000. Now suppose that we are able to reduce the productivity of
$11,000 of detection avoidance spending from eleven percentage
points to one, so that the reduction in expected sanction was only
$10,000. The offender would no longer find the detection avoidance
spending worthwhile. More to the present point, however, detection
avoidance would not operate to decrease the all-in cost of the
underlying violation. In effect the cost of the violation would be
$89,000 greater after the productivity reduction.140

It should also be recognized that there is in fact a small but growing body of systematic
evidence indicating that offenders as a group do indeed respond to the possibility of
sanction by reducing underlying violations. Levitt & Miles, supra note 23, (reviewing
advances in testing for the deterrent effect of laws). If the behavioral association drawn in
the preceding paragraph—between raising sanctions and reducing productivity—is valid, this
body of evidence also implies that offenders respond to decreasing the productivity of
detection avoidance by engaging less in the activity.
140 In fact, decreasing the productivity of detection avoidance increases deterrence of the
underlying wrong even if it does not discourage detection avoidance, as can be seen in the
139
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Of course, lowering the productivity of detection avoidance can
never increase the effective sanction above a 100% probability of
paying the legal sanction itself. Spending nothing on detection
avoidance is always an option. But again the analysis is comparative.
And the effect on underlying deterrence of sanctioning detection
avoidance is bounded in precisely the same way.

C. Public detection costs
Reducing the productivity of detection avoidance is not all good
news. Productivity reductions are likely to come at the price of
additional public “detection” costs. Decreasing the effectiveness of
the detection avoidance dollar may, for example, require more costly
surveillance systems or more lengthy and numerous interrogation
sessions.
But these additional costs hardly defeat the argument for the
technological approach. For the sanctioning approach is also likely to
require additional public “detection” costs. Sanctioning efforts to
obstruct primary process—whether by use of procedural rules or the
criminal law—requires additional, costly process.
To be sure, scale economies may reduce the cost of such higher order
process. Prosecutors are sometimes said to pile obstruction and
perjury charges onto primary activity indictments.141 When a suspect
on some underlying violation is also suspected of obstructing justice,
some of the costs of investigating and adjudicating the obstruction
can be shared with prosecution of the primary violation.
Yet the additional costs of prosecuting procedural violations are still
likely to be substantial. The actus reus of obstruction is often quite
different from the actus reus of the underlying crime. The obstructive
act is apt to have occurred at a different time and place with a
different set of potential witnesses and a different array of alibis. In
fact, if the piling on effect is real and recognized, obstructers have an
incentive to make this so.
Moreover, the mens rea of obstruction crimes are orthogonal to those
of the underlying wrong. Proving that a defendant obstructed justice
generally requires proving that she had in mind a particular ongoing
or imminent proceeding or investigation and that her intentions were
“wrongful.”142 Proving that a witness committed perjury requires
showing not just that her statement was logically false, but also that

example by positing that the productivity of detection avoidance is lowered from twelve to
eleven probability points.
141 See Oesterle, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1204.
142 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, ___ (2005).
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the falsity was willful or at least knowing, a showing that typically
requires additional investigation, evidence, and deliberation.143
Furthermore, detection avoidance that occurs far downstream along
the procedural flow—as opposed to detection avoidance that can be
charged in the original indictment or claimed in the original
complaint—will often require separate costly hearings with less
access to the benefits of the scale economies of consolidated process.
The lengthy sequence of motions and orders in the Morgan Stanley
case for example, lasted from April 2004 to March 2005 and involved
several sets of briefs and hearings.144
And let us not forget that prosecuting process crimes often requires a
cumbersome and imperfect administrative hand off. The SEC, for
example, has no authority to bring criminal actions. Should the SEC
come upon evidence of criminal obstruction in the course of
investigating or prosecuting a civil action for securities fraud, it must
refer the matter to the Department of Justice.145 Any economies of
scale in prosecuting both underlying civil violations and process
crimes must to some extent be dissipated in this bureaucratic
transfer. Indeed, some amount of separation between civil and
criminal prosecutions is specifically enforced in order to prevent
criminal prosecutors from end-running limitations on discovery in
criminal actions by tapping into expanded discovery in a parallel civil
action.146

D. Summary comparison with sanctioning
What we are left with, then, are two policy alternatives—sanctioning
and the technological attack—that are similar along two dimensions
in the social calculus, but quite different along a third. They both
increase primary deterrence and they both incur public detection
costs. But the technological attack affirmatively reduces private
detection avoidance costs, while the sanctioning approach—in any
feasible manifestation—increases them.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1621, 23.
Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
144 Coleman Holdings v. Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at __ (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005) (describing motions and orders)
145 See, e.g., Alyssa Hall & Adam M. Schoeberlein, Securities Fraud, AM J. CRIM L. 941, 995
(2000)
146 For example, among the criminal charges facing HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy were
three counts of perjury arising from an SEC deposition in a parallel civil action arising from
the same set of transactions and occurrences. The judge dismissed the perjury charges,
however, because Justice Department officials working on the criminal side were deemed to
have been too closely involved in the civil deposition. U.S. v. Scrushy, (N. D. Ala, April 15,
2005) (CR-03-BE-0530-S) (mem. and order)
143
144
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X. Methods of technological attack
How then do we go about decreasing the productivity of detection
avoidance?
It is clear that merely devoting additional public resources to
detecting violations will not do. Simply questioning yet another
witness, for example, will not necessarily decrease the productivity of
detection avoidance spending. If without coaching, the witness’s
answers will increase the chance of having to pay a $100,000 sanction
by ten percentage points, but with $5000 of “preparation” this can be
wholly prevented, then interrogating an additional witness will most
likely increase, rather than decrease the productivity of detection
avoidance spending.
Rather public detection spending must be specifically channeled so
that each dollar, each hour, each erg of effort spent avoiding
detection buys less of a reduction in the probability of detection.
This is essentially a matter of making detection avoidance more
difficult at each step—so that, for example, $5000 of witness
coaching only partially prevents the witness’s positive impact on the
probability of detection. Accordingly, one natural approach is to
design evidentiary process so as to exploit and amplify the difficulties
generally encountered in all human endeavors. The idea is to employ
these generally detrimental difficulties for the social good by using
them against the maleficent detection avoider. Two difficulties, of
cognition and of cooperation, have special potential.

A. Difficulties of cognition
Imagine that the offender wishes to reduce the probability of
detection by supplying a witness to swear (falsely) that the offender
did not commit the underlying crime. Exploiting the witness’s
cognitive limitations, the law takes several steps to reduce the
productivity of time and effort spent preparing this witness.147
Consider, first, that the witness must generally respond to
questioning from memory.148 In order to provide consistent and
detailed answers, the fabricator must memorize both her main
storyline and her answers to those interrogative spurs that she can
anticipate. Moreover, given her cognitive inability to anticipate all
possible questions, she will also have to memorize on the fly the

147 Sanchirico, Upside of Cognitive Error, supra note 38 at 317-325 (describing these steps in
more detail)
148 To the extent that the witness is permitted to refer to notes and cues, these will generally
be made available to the questioner, and are therefore of limited efficacy. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 612 (governing disclosure to opponents of writings used to refresh memory)
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answers she gives to questions that she did not expect. These
spontaneous answers may determine the consistency of later answers
to unanticipated questions, and may even necessitate changing part of
her prepared story going forward—which change must itself be
memorized on the spot.
Of course, the questioner’s memory is also limited. But the
questioner is generally permitted to make use of whatever cognitive
aids she pleases without any obligation to share these with the other
side.149 And indeed using computer software like Trial Director and
Summation, she can instantaneously check the consistency of a
witness’s answer with her own prior remarks or other evidence.150
Such software is increasingly employed by questioners in deposing
and interrogating witnesses. By allowing the questioner the full range
of cognitive aids, while limiting the technology available to the
questioned, the law severely reduces the productivity of effort exerted
by the questioned in fabricating testimony. As a result of this
lopsided technological restrictiveness, each additional hour spent
preparing for testimony yields much less in terms of reduced
detection probability percentage points. The productivity of training
for a race is low when your opponent can use a bicycle but you must
run on foot. Best not to enter the race at all.
Witness preparation is also rendered less productive due to three
specific aspects of how testimony, depositions, and interrogations
generally proceed. First, the questioner will usually not see the
questions in advance.151 Time spent preparing answers to the
questions that one can anticipate is thereby less productive for the
fact that such preparation may well be rendered essentially worthless
with a few poorly improvised answers to questions that were

See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (providing that documents and tangible things prepared in
anticipation of litigation are discoverable only upon a showing of substantial need and a
practical inability to obtain materials by other means, and that even when discovery of such
materials is permitted, mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories are still
protected); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-13 (1947) (explicitly protecting against
disclosure of mental impressions, etc., outside the context of the discovery of documents
and tangible things; codified in part in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
150 See Summation Legal Techs., Inc., Summation Legal Technologies, Inc.: America's #1
Litigation Support Software, at http://www.summation.com (last visited July 26, 2005);
inData Corp., Welcome to inData Corporation, at http:// www.trialdirector.com (last visited
July 26, 2005).
151 Of course, she may be asked the same questions at trial that she was asked on deposition
or during interrogation. The point is that the first time she encounters the questions her on
the spot answers will go on record. If this first time is on deposition, and she says
something at trial that is inconsistent with her on the spot answer on deposition, her
deposition answer is often admissible at trial for the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). If the first time is during interrogation, her earlier answers
cannot generally be admitted for substantive use, but can be used to impeach her credibility
should she give inconsistent testimony given at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613 (providing
procedural rules for impeachment use of prior inconsistent statements).
149
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unexpected. One inconsistent ad-lib may be enough of a wedge to
crack open an otherwise impregnable fabrication.
Second, the questioner need not commit to her questions ahead of
time, but may rather adjust the subject or tenor of additional
questions based on what she perceives to be uncertainties and
inconsistencies in the answers provided to previous questions. This
renders preparation less productive because the witness is denied the
opportunity of playing the odds that particular topics will not be
tested. The less the questioner prepares for a line of questioning, that
is, the more it will be emphasized. Conversely, the more the
questioner prepares for a line of questioning, the less it will be
emphasized. Preparation is thus rendered less valuable. Diligently
preparing for a particular set of questions makes it more likely that
such questions will be ignored once the questioner discovers that this
avenue of interrogation is not fruitful.
Lastly, interrogations and depositions exploit the effects of fatigue.
The difficult task of fabricating testimony becomes all the more
difficult as the fabricator tires. While interrogators and deposers may
substitute in and out during questioning, the witness is on her own.
To be successful, therefore, the witness’s preparation must enable her
to so internalize her story that reciting it and maintaining it becomes
nearly as rote as those few other cognitive tasks—like remembering
one’s address and phone number—that can still be reliably
accomplished by those who are mentally drained. Hours of
preparation can be rendered virtually ineffective by a few unguarded
answers in the last few moments of a long day of questioning.152

B. Difficulties of cooperation
Game theorists, especially those studying “mechanism design,” have
long recognized the possibility of exploiting the difficulties and
fragilities of coordination and cooperation among multiple agents.153

The procedural devices just described also hamper the sincere witness. But as argued in
detail in Sanchirico, Upside of Cognitive Error, supra note 38, at 317-344 their effect is greater on
the insincere witness given the higher cognitive faculties that fabrication requires. What
matters is the differential effect.
153 See, e.g., Jacques Crémer & Richard P. McLean, Full Extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and
Dominant Strategy Auctions, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1247 (1988) (describing the exploitation of
correlations in bidders’ private information in the design of auctions); DREW FUDENBERG &
DAVID LEVINE, GAME THEORY 293 (1990) (describing the “shoot them all” mechanism
whereby the principal learns information that is perfectly shared by multiple agents); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18,
25 (1986) (showing that where two informed parties with opposite interests can omit but not
fabricate, Nash equilibrium reports reveal full information); John Moore & Rafael Repullo,
Subgame Perfect Implementation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1191 (exploring how equally informed
agents can be played off against each other in a sequential mechanism); Chris William
Sanchirico, Games, Information, and Evidence Production, 2 AMER. L & ECON REV. 342, 350-52
(modeling use of one party’s evidence to set the other’s litigation payoffs).
152
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These lessons apply to reducing the productivity of detection
avoidance activity. Indeed this is one setting in which the Prisoners’
Dilemma is not just a metaphor.154
Detection avoidance, like any human activity, often requires or is
facilitated by coordination among several individuals, especially if it is
effected on a large scale. The state can play these individuals against
each other by structuring interrogation and prosecution to amplify
the temptation to break rank. “For crimes in which the core of the
offense is false information, perjury, obstruction, false filings and
false books and records, cooperating criminals are frequently the key
source of information.”155 The increased difficulty of remaining
coordinated thus increases the cost of successful cover up.
Specific practical techniques employed by law enforcement in this
area include, first, the hearsay exception for statements of a coconspirator. Statements made by a co-conspirator (during the
pendency of the conspiracy and in furtherance thereof) may be used
substantively against a party even if they are not made for the
purpose of testifying in the current case.156 It is not enough,
therefore, to carefully guard one’s own statements regarding
perpetration of the crime. One must also guard the statements made
by one’s partners, which for hearsay purposes will be treated as if
they are one’s own.
Other devices include prosecutorial immunity,157 plea agreements,158
non prosecution agreements,159 and special protection for
whistleblowers.160 All of these make cooperation in detection
avoidance harder to maintain and thus reduce the usual productivity
gains from teamwork. Thus, in covering up evidence of a law
violation, two “shovels” may be putatively more productive than one.
But then another person knows where the bodies are buried. And all
Professor Katyal has recently described specific ways in which the law (as principal)
accomplishes this task via the doctrine surrounding conspiracy. Neal Kumar Katyal,
Conspiracy Theory 112 YALE L. J. 1307 (2003).
155 Carberry & Gordon, supra note 36. For example, in government’s financial fraud case
against HealthSouth CEO, Richard Scrushy more than a dozen of Scrushy’s former
subordinates pled guilty and testified for the government. Milt Freudenheim, New Indictment
for Ex-Chief of HealthSouth, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 30, 2004, at C5. Scrushy was acquitted in this
case, but still faces the prospect of a civil suit by the SEC and various private suits. Andrew
Ward, Scrushy Facing Civil Suit after Acquittal, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at 30.
156 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)
157 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005
158 See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.420 Plea Agreements—
Considerations to be Weighed (“In determining whether it would be appropriate to enter
into a plea agreement, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant
considerations, including: 1) The defendant's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others…”)
159 See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.600 Entering into Non-prosecution
Agreements in Return for Cooperation – Generally, et seq…
160 See, e.g., 18 USC § 1513.
154
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the effort expended inearthing the evidence is rendered ineffective if
that person is also helpful to authorities in guiding them to the
broken ground.

XI. Conclusion
Day in and day out, prosecutors and regulators, judges and juries,
struggle against the headwind of offenders’ efforts to impede the
discovery and prosecution of wrongdoing. But the areas of basic
legal research that ought to help us to understand and ameliorate this
costly resistance remain largely silent on the topic. Scholarship on
evidentiary procedure skews heavily toward the problems of
disinterested and sincerely mistaken witnesses, leaving the problems
of purposeful evidentiary tampering largely untended. The theory of
public enforcement, on the other hand, focuses almost exclusively on
governmental efforts to detect violations, with little to offer on
violators’ efforts to avoid detection.
This article has attempted to address this scholarly oversight, with an
eye toward the practical problems now confronting legal policy in
this area. While the recent incremental policy trend has been toward
sanctioning detection avoidance activities, this article suggests that a
better course may be to intensify what has always been the law’s chief
mode of attack, namely designing evidentiary procedure to render
such activities cost ineffective.
Both sanctioning detection avoidance and reducing its technological
productivity enhance deterrence of underlying violations. And both
do so in return for additional public spending. But their effects on
the social waste of detection avoidance activities differ markedly.
The ability of sanctions to curtail the social cost of detection
avoidance is restricted by the special recursivity of that activity.
Sanctioning cover up activities simultaneously sends two messages to
violators: don’t cover up as much; but to the extent you still do, cover
that up more. On the other hand, constraining the productivity of
detection avoidance globally discourages the activity. The upshot is
this: instead of spending more public funds prosecuting obstruction
or perjury, or deciding on procedural sanctions, as seems to be the
trend, better to use the same resources to shore up those—albeit less
conspicuous—aspects of evidentiary procedure that reduce the cost
effectiveness for violators of spending resources to avoid
punishment. Better, in particular, to make detection avoidance a
more difficult enterprise for violators by further exploiting the limits
of their cognitive and cooperative abilities.
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XII. Appendix
This appendix reformulates in mathematical terms arguments made
in the text.
Model. Let a i denote spending on detection avoidance of “order” i.
Thus, a1 is spending to avoid detection of the underlying violation,
a 2 is spending to avoid detection of activities attendant to a1 , etc…
Let d i represent public spending devoted to detecting avoidance of
order i, incurred in proportion to the extent to which perpetrators
engage in order i avoidance.161 The variable d 0 is detection effort
directed at the underlying violation.162 Let s i be the sanction
imposed on detection avoidance of order i. The variable s 0 is the
sanction imposed on the underlying violation. We retain three
standard assumptions from the neoclassical approach (as described in
Part II.A): that offenders are risk neutral; that they are rational; and
that there are no false positives in detection.
In a model without detection avoidance the level of deterrence (of
the underlying activity) is: `0 = p 0 ( d 0 ) s 0 , where p 0 ( d 0 ) is the
probability of detection for the underlying activity, a function of
respective detection effort. This expected sanction conditional on
committing the violation is what the potential violator weighs against
her private gains from the illicit activity in deciding whether to
commit the offense.
With detection avoidance added to the model, the level of deterrence
for the underlying violation is the violator’s minimized all-in expected
sanction conditional on commission of the underlying violation,
where the violator minimizes this expected sanction by choosing the
sequence a1 , a 2 ,...

The model can also accommodate “fixed” costs of both detection and detection
avoidance.
162 We could also include a fixed cost component to detection, incurred irrespective of the
number of violations. Symmetrically, we could also include a fixed cost component for
detection avoidance, incurred regardless of whether a violation is committed.
161
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In this expression pi ( d i , ai ; ai +1 , ai + 2 ,... ) is the probability of
detection for ith order detection avoidance, a function of ith order
detection effort, ith order detection avoidance itself, and all higher
orders of detection avoidance. Assumed signs of first derivatives are
indicated above the respective arguments. Three things are worth
noticing about this expression. First, the probability of detection for
ith order detection avoidance (including 0th order, the primary activity)
is a positive function of detection avoidance of order i and a negative
function of detection avoidance of orders i+1, i+2, etc…. Consider
for example, i = 1. The more the violator covers up, the more likely
that cover up is detected. The more the violator covers up the cover
up, however, the less likely that first order cover up is detected.
Moreover, detection of first order cover up is also rendered less likely,
the more the violator engages in third order cover up—i.e., covers up
the cover up of cover up. This last effect is not emphasized in the
text, but is added here for realism. The idea is that higher orders of
detection avoidance shore up all lower orders.

Second, no assumption is made here regarding the statistic
dependence or independence of detection of detection avoidance of
order i relative to detection of detection avoidance of any other order
j i . The expectation operator is linear, regardless of statistical
dependence: i.e., E [ X + Y ] = E [ X ] + E [Y ] even if X and Y are
statistically dependent.
Third, and most importantly, we see in expression (1) the formal
manifestation of the three effects of detection avoidance on primary
activity deterrence, as described verbally in Part IV.A. First,
detection avoidance (of all orders) lowers the probability of detection
for the underlying violation. This is signified by the fact that
increasing any or all coordinates of the sequence a1 , a 2 ,... reduces p0 .
Second, this reduction is paid for by the violator and that payment
adds to the all-in effective sanction: detection avoidance spending a i
directly increases deterrence, as shown in the first summation in (1).
Lastly, expected sanctions for detection avoidance ( s 1 , s 2 ,... )
contribute to the all-in effective sanction for the underlying violation.
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Violators whose private benefits exceed deterrence choose to commit
the offense. If private benefits are distributed according to the
cumulative distribution F, therefore, 1 F ( ` ) potential offenders
choose to commit the offense. Social costs from producing
deterrence level ` are thus:
C ( ` ) = (1 F ( ` ) )
14243
proportion of
offenders

i =1

ai +

i =0

di +

p cs
{

i i
i = 0 cost of
sanctions

We see here the formal manifestation of the new social costs borne
from adding detection avoidance to the model, as described in Part
IV.B. The first sum captures the social waste of detection avoidance.
The second, the public cost of detecting not just the primary
violation, but also detection avoidance. And the third sum represents
the cost of sanctioning not just detected primary violations but also
detected detection avoidance activities. Following Becker, the
coefficient c is the cost per sanction imposed. To simplify the
analysis, assume from hereon that c = 0 . Such is the case when the
sanction is a fine.
Letting B ( ` ) represent the social benefits of deterrence, the social
problem is to choose s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ,... and d 0 , d 1 , d 2 ,... to maximize
B ( ` ) C ( ` ) . The preliminary, social cost minimization problem
that we focus on is choice of the most efficient means of producing
any given level of deterrence ` : min C ( ` ) : ` = ` .
s i ,d i

The marginal efficiency of a policy instrument x will be measured by
its marginal deterrence cost: its marginal contribution to costs per its
marginal contribution to deterrence:
MDC x

LC
Lx

L`
.
Lx

The greater this ratio, the less efficient is instrument x on the margin.
At a solution to the social cost minimization problem given ` , the
marginal deterrence cost of all instruments positively employed must
be equal. Otherwise, the cost of producing deterrence ` could be
decreased by substituting low marginal deterrence cost instruments
for high. Roughly speaking, instruments whose marginal deterrence
cost tends to be lower (across all levels of their own employment and
the employment of other instruments) will tend to be more heavily
employed at an optimum. If society is currently not at a social
optimum, then the marginal deterrence costs of instruments may not
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be equal. In that case, the most efficient way to increase deterrence
on the margin is to rely on those instruments with the lowest
marginal deterrence costs. Furthermore, holding the level of
deterrence constant, such deterrence can be more efficiently provided
by substituting low marginal deterrence cost instrument for high.
From (1), we may derive the first order condition for an optimum in
the violator’s detection avoidance choice problem. We will do so in a
way that corresponds to the text discussion of the upside and
downside of each order of detection avoidance. (See, e.g., Part
VI.A.1.) The (marginal) “sanctions-decreasing upside” of first order
detection avoidance is the degree to which it lowers the expected
sanction for the primary violation: LpLa01 s 0 > 0 . We will assume that
the derivative in this expression is strictly decreasing (in an absolute
value sense) in the level of first order detection avoidance. In other
words, first order detection avoidance spending has a diminishing
marginal impact on the probability of detection for the underlying
violation. In fact, we will assume this generally for the impact of
higher order detection avoidance on lower order detection
probabilities. Against this marginal upside the violator weighs two
marginal costs: the direct marginal cost, which is simply one; and the
(marginal) “sanctions-increasing downside:” LpLa11 s 1 > 0 . We assume
that the derivative in this expression is strictly increasing in the level
of first order detection avoidance: spending on first order detection
avoidance increases the chance of detection thereof at an increasing
rate. The violator sets first order detection avoidance at the point
where its marginal productivity equals its marginal cost:
Lp0
Lp1
La1 s 0 = La1 s 1 + 1 . (If this equation cannot be satisfied, the violator is
at a corner solution, a1 = 0 .) More generally, the sanctions-reducing
upside for detection avoidance of order i is

i 1 Lp j
j = 0 La i

s j > 0 . The

direct cost and sanctions-increasing downside are the same as for first
order
detection
avoidance,
and
the
violator
sets:
i 1 Lp j
j 0 La i

s j = LaLpii s i + 1 , unless this cannot be satisfied in which case

ai = 0 .
Sanctioning underlying violations. Suppose for purposes of illustration
that detection avoidance is not sanctioned: s 1 = s 2 = ... = 0 . In that

case, the avoider sets each a i according to: LpLa0i s 0 = 1 , assuming an
interior solution at all orders. Increasing the sanction s 0 for the
primary violation raises the sanctions-decreasing upside for first order
avoidance as well as avoidance of all higher orders. How does this
affect detection avoidance at each order?
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To render this difficult problem tractable assume that cross effects
across orders of detection avoidance are negligible:

L 2 p0
La i La j

= 0, i

j.

(For a discussion of such cross effects see Part V.B.) In this case the
equations LpLa0i s 0 = 1 , for i = 1, 2,... are independent and for each i the
implicit function theorem yields:
La i
=
Ls 0

+
}
Lp 0
La i

L 2 p0
s0 > 0 .
La i La i
1
424
3

Therefore, increasing the primary sanction increases detection
avoidance of each order. Raising the sanction raises the marginal
sanction-reducing downside of each order of detection avoidance.
The violator increases each order of detection avoidance until the
marginal upside diminishes back down to the marginal direct cost, 1.
On the other hand, increasing s 0 does increase primary deterrence.
Applying the envelope theorem:
L`
= p0 +
Ls 0

Lp0
La
s 0 + 1 i = p0 > 0 .
Ls 0
i =1 La i
144244
3

(2)

=0

Notice that the term above the horizontal bracket zeros out even for
a i that are at the corner, a i = 0 . Although LpLa0i s 0 + 1 need not be
zero at a corner, if it is not, then

La i
Ls 0

will be.

Therefore, increasing the sanction for the primary violation increases
deterrence of the primary violation by p0 , but also increases
detection avoidance. Thus, even though the sanction is costless to
impose ( c = 0 ), the deterrence it generates comes at a social cost, and
its marginal cost per deterrence is positive not zero, as in Becker:

LC
Ls 0

(

L`
= 1 F (`)
Ls 0

)

La i
i =1 Ls 0

p0 > 0 .

This generalizes Malik’s result, as described in Part II.B.
Sanctioning detection avoidance. The effect on higher orders of detection
avoidance of imposing a sanction s 1 on first order detection
avoidance is similar in form to the effect on all orders of detection
avoidance of raising the sanction s 0 on the primary violation. First
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order detection avoidance plays the role played by the primary
violation. For higher order detection avoidance a 2 , a 3 ,... the offender
sets: LpLa0i s 0 LpLa1i s 1 = 1 . By the implicit function theorem, the effect
of raising s 1 is
+
}
Lp1
La i

La i
=
Ls 1

L 2 p1
s1 > 0 , i
La i La i
1
424
3

2

Similarly, raising the sanction on ith order detection avoidance
increases detection avoidance at all orders higher than i:
La i +k
=
Ls i

+8
67
Lpi
La i + k

L 2 pi
si > 0 , k 1 .
La i +kLa i +k
14243

The effect on primary deterrence of raising the sanction on ith order
detection avoidance is also simplified by the envelope theorem, to
pi . Raising the sanction on ith order detection avoidance (keeping
the sanction on lower order detection avoidance fixed) has marginal
deterrence cost:

LC
Ls i

(

L`
= 1 F (`)
Ls i

)

+
}
}
La i
La i + k
+
Ls i k =1 Ls i
.
pi

This cost may be positive or negative depending on relative
responses at ith and higher orders of detection avoidance.
Sanctioning hierarchies: uniform. Suppose that we impose a uniform
sanction s on all orders of detection avoidance and the primary
violation. More generally, suppose we raise the uniform sanction
from some existing level. An application of the envelope theorem to
(1) (using logic similar to that used in deriving (2)) establishes that
raising the uniform sanction always increases primary activity
deterrence `. However, as we will show, it does so at the cost of
increasing detection avoidance. Increasing the uniform sanction can
only increase those orders of detection avoidance that the violator
currently sets at 0. For all orders i = 1, 2,... for which the violator is
currently exercising positive detection avoidance, the violator is
setting:
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Lpi
s +1
Lai

i 1

Lp j

La i
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j =0

+

Lpi
s =1
La
i
{

(3)

+

The first term in parentheses is order i’s sanctions-reducing upside.
The second, its sanctions-increasing downside. To satisfy (3), the net
of these two terms must be positive, so that (multiplied by the
sanction s) their sum equals the direct marginal cost of ith order
detection avoidance. Therefore, increasing s increases the net
marginal upside of ith order detection avoidance and thereby increases
ith order detection avoidance. Given our assumptions on pi , this
increases ai . (The parenthesis in (3) is the net marginal benefit of
ai ; if this increases due to a change in s, the violator responds by
increasing ai until the marginal benefit diminishes back down to the
fixed marginal cost of 1.) More formally, the implicit function
theorem yields:
+
644744
8
i 1 Lp
Lpi
j

La i
=
Ls

j =0

La i

La i

L2 p j

L 2 pi
s > 0.
La i La i
j = 0 La i La i
144424443
i 1

Sanctioning hierarchies: variable. For sanctions that vary across orders, we
have already seen that the envelope theorem implies that increasing
the sanction at any given order increases primary deterrence. Therefore,
an increase in all sanctions, possibly varying in magnitude across
orders, increases primary deterrence. What kind variation in increase
across orders also reduces detection avoidance spending? Focus on a
particular order i. Recall that
i 1
j =0

Lp j
La i
1
424
3
+

sj

Lpi
si = 1 .
La
i
{

(4)

+

Our assumptions on pi imply that the left hand side decreases in ai .
The implicit function theorem, therefore, implies that any change in
the sequence s0 , s1 ,... that increases (decreases) the left side—
evaluated at the violator’s current choice of ai —will cause the
violator to increase (decrease) ai . The question, then, is what change
in the sequence of sanctions decreases the left side? The condition
for decrease is:
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ds j

Lp i
dsi < 0
La
i
{
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Combining (5) with the first order condition (4) we have:
i 1
j =0
i 1
j =0

Lp j
Lai
Lp j
Lai

ds j
sj

<

dsi
si

Lp j

i 1

M
j =0

ds j
j sj

<

dsi
si

, where a j =

Lai
i 1
j =0

sj

Lp j
Lai

.

(6)

sj

In words, a necessary condition for ith order detection avoidance to
decrease is that the percentage change in si exceed the (weighted)
average percentage change in lower order s j . (In the case in which
ai affects only pi 1 , (6) reduces to dssi i 11 < dssi i .) Thus, if we are
increasing all lower order sanctions by 10%, the sanction at order i
must be increased by more than 10%. This continues to be so even
after the base for the higher sanction has grown much larger than
that for lower order sanctions.
Conversely, increasing the higher order sanction by a lower proportion
than the lower causes the left side of (4) to increase even more than it
would were all sanctions increased by the same proportion, as in the
uniform sanction case examined above.
Technological attack. Setting sanctions for all orders of detection
avoidance equal to zero, focus on the effect of d 0 on

p 0 ( d 0 , a 1 , a 2 ,... ) . For purposes of this analysis, we may combine
detection avoidance into one variable a and we may drop all “0”
subscripts. The violator sets LaLp ( d , a ) s = 1 . An intensification of
the technological attack is an increase in the parameter d that: 1)
reduces the marginal productivity of detection avoidance, i.e.,

( d , a ) < 0 , and 2) does not increase the probability of detection
in the absence of detection avoidance, i.e., dp ( 0, d ) 0 . In that case
L2 p
LaLd

64748
La
L2 p
L2 p
=
(d , a )
(d , a ) s < 0 ,
LaLd
LaLa
Ld
14243
so that detection avoidance spending decreases. For the effect on
+ 8
+ 8
6474
6
474
a 2p
p
p
deterrence, first note that d ( a , d ) =
a d ( a , d ) + d ( 0, d ) > 0 .
0
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Therefore, raising d increases deterrence:
deterrence cost of d becomes:
}
L`
La
= (1 F ( `) ) 1 +
Ld
Ld

LC
Ld

L`
Ld

=

+
}
Lp
Ld

s > 0 . The marginal

Lp
s.
Ld
{
+

Increasing d is more cost effective the more doing so reduces the
productivity of detection avoidance. Indeed, it is even possible that
increasing d will produce more deterrence at lower social cost. Such
is the case if a d < 1 .
Reducing the marginal productivity of detection avoidance is not the
same as increasing the marginal cost of probability reductions. This
is an important distinction because a marginal cost increase does not
necessarily lead to a reduction in detection avoidance spending:
although the violator “buys” fewer probability points, each costs
more.
Given p a < 0 and p aa > 0 , a marginal productivity reduction implies,
but is not implied by a marginal cost increase. Marginal cost is

( p , d ) = ( p a ( p 1 ( p , d ) , d )) .
p a ( p 1 ( p , d ) , d ) decreases in d.
1

a
p

This increases in d if and only if
Taking the derivative of this

expression yields

(

pa p

1

( p , d ), d )

d

where p a < 0 and
2

p
a d

=
p
d

+ +
}
}
2
p
a a

a
d

( p, d )

2
p
a d

,

> 0 (derived above) implies

a
d

> 0 . Therefore,

> 0 is sufficient for increasing marginal cost, but marginal cost

can decrease even if

2
p
a d

< 0 . For a specific example of the latter

possibility, consider p ( a , d ) = e
a pd =

1
p

>0

a d

a ( p , d ) = d ln p , wherein

, so that marginal cost increases in d, but

p ad = dp2 ( da 1 ) , so that marginal productivity goes down in d only
for low a.

